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Abstract 
 
This paper documents the income distribution changes experienced by Argentina 
during the last decades. Inequality substantially increased, and despite economic 
growth during some periods, poverty also went significantly up. Two types of 
episodes have shaped Argentina’s income distribution: deep macroeconomic 
crisis and periods of openness and integration. The sizeable raise in inequality in 
the 90s seems to be associated to reallocations against unskilled-labor intensive 
sectors, and especially to skilled-biased technological change within most 
sectors, both factors stimulated by the process of economic integration. The 
depth and speed of the reforms and the absence of public policies to ease the 
transition contributed to the particular severity of the income distribution 
changes in Argentina.  
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1. Introduction 
Argentina was traditionally one of the most equal economies in Latin America. The 
available evidence shows low and stable inequality in the country in the three decades 
following the World War II, with poverty indexes not far from the ones in the developed 
countries (Altimir, 1986; Gasparini, 1999; WIDER, 2000). The story for the following 
three decades is completely different. From mid 70s to the present Argentina witnessed 
distributional changes that dramatically increased inequality and poverty, which now reach 
values close to the Latin American averages (Lee, 2000; Gasparini et al., 2001; Altimir et 
al., 2002). The Gini coefficient for the distribution of household per capita income 
increased from 34.5 in 1974 to 53.8 in 2002, while the poverty headcount ratio increased 
from around 5% to more than 50% in the same period. There are no countries in Latin 
America and the Caribbean that experienced such dramatic changes in the income 
distribution. 
 
Inequality has not increased steadily during this period. It is possible to identify two types 
of episodes that shaped the income distribution: macroeconomic crisis (88-89 and 01-02), 
and periods of increased integration (late 70s and most of the 90s). The distributional 
impacts of the macroeconomic crises were stronger, although of a shorter duration. Periods 
of economic openness are associated to changes in the economic structure against 
unskilled-labor intensive sectors, and to skilled-biased technological change. Both 
phenomena have reduced the relative demand for unskilled labor, decreasing employment 
and wages for this group, which has translated into higher inequality and poverty.  
 
This paper scrutinizes income distribution changes in Argentina, stressing the links between 
the process of integration to the world economy and the growth of inequality and poverty. 
The study presents alternative explanations of the distributional patterns observed in 
Argentina and assesses their relative importance in the light of the economic theory and the 
available empirical evidence. The paper argues that although integration may certainly 
increase inequality in the short and medium run for countries like Argentina, the 
government can smooth the transition. Failing to do that, as in the Argentine case, may 
place the whole process of integration and liberalization into doubt and risk.      
 
The rest of the study is organized as follows. In section 2 we carefully document the 
distributional changes experienced by Argentina in the last three decades. Although the 
focus is on inequality, statistics on poverty, aggregate welfare, polarization and educational 
mobility are also presented. The direct determinants of the distributional changes are 
examined in section 3, where the role of the increase in the wage premium for skilled 
workers is emphasized. The links between global market integration and changes in the 
wage premium are explored in section 4. After describing the process of integration in 
Argentina, we review the theoretical links between globalization and income distribution, 
and provide evidence on these links. Section 5 summarizes results on the distributional 
impact of fiscal policy in Argentina, in order to assess the effectiveness of public policies to 
counteract “market” distributional changes. Section 6 concludes with an interpretation of 
the main results of the paper.  
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2. Distributional changes in Argentina  
Distributional changes can be traced with the help of the Encuesta Permanente de Hogares 
(EPH), the main household survey in Argentina. The EPH is conducted each May and 
October by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos (INDEC). It now covers 31 urban 
areas which are home of 75% of the Argentine urban population, which in turn represents 
85% of Argentina’s total population.1 The number of observations of each survey is around 
80,000. The EPH gathers information on individual sociodemographic characteristics, 
employment status, hours of work, wages, incomes, type of job, education, and migration 
status. The EPH is available for the Greater Buenos Aires (GBA) since 1974. The rest of 
the urban areas have been added during the last two decades.  
 
Income inequality has significantly increased since the 70s (see Figure 2.1). The Gini 
coefficient for the distribution of equivalized household income in Greater Buenos Aires 
climbed from 0.324 in 1974 to 0.518 in 2003.2 Inequality greatly increased in the second 
half of the 70s, remained stable in the first half of the 80s and substantially increased during 
the macoeconomic crisis of the late 80s. After stabilization, inequality went down, although 
did not reach the pre-crisis levels. The 90s were again times of increasing inequality: the 
Gini climbed 6 points from 1992 to 1998. The recent macroeconomic crisis of 2001-2002 
pushed the Gini another 4 points up.  
 
The rest of this section is aimed at showing (i) that the pattern of Figure 2.1 is robust to 
various methodological considerations, (ii) that the increase in inequality suffered by 
Argentina is very large compared to changes experienced in other Latin American 
countries, and (iii) that it was large enough to have had dramatic consequences on poverty 
and welfare. We finally show estimates of polarization and mobility, two distributional 
dimensions closely related to inequality.  
 
2.1. Robustness to measures, variables and geographical areas 
 
Table 2.1 shows various inequality indices for the distribution of equivalized household 
income in the GBA. All measures suggest the increasing pattern shown in Figure 2.1. The 
reported inequality growth is even larger for indices attaching greater weights to the bottom 
tail of the distribution (e.g. Atkinson with inequality-aversion parameter equal to 2). The 
poor have significantly lost in relative terms: the share of the poorest decile fell from 3% in 
                                                 
1 Although the EPH does not meet one of the Deininger and Squire (1996) criteria since it is an urban survey, 
it represents a very large share of Argentina’s population. Additionally, the missing population does not seem 
to affect many results. For instance, using a recent survey conducted by the World Bank that include rural 
areas, we find only a negligible difference in all inequality measures when we include or ignore rural areas.  
2 Equivalized household income for a given individual is defined as total household income divided by the 
number of adult equivalents in the household raised to a parameter of household economies of scale. In the 
benchmark case we take the adult equivalent scale used for official poverty estimates, and a parameter of 
economies of scale equal to .8  (see Deaton and Zaidi, 2002). All values are for the October wave of the EPH, 
except 2003, where the May wave is used. The Greater Buenos Aires (GBA) is an urban area with around 1/3 
of the Argentine population.    
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1974 to 1.2% in 2003, while the income ratio between the two extreme deciles rose from 8 
to more than 30 in three decades.   
 
The inequality patterns are similar when considering other measures of household income 
(e.g. household per capita income in Table 2.2), or individual labor income variables (e.g. 
earnings in Table 2.3 and hourly wages in Table 2.4). The increase in wage inequality was 
not as large as the increase in household income inequality, but anyway substantial: while 
the Gini for the equivalized household income distribution climbed 19 points between 1974 
and 2002, the increase for the hourly earnings distribution was 10 Gini points.  
 
In part of the following analysis we select six particular years: 1974, 1980, 1986, 1992, 
1998 and 2002. These years allow defining five sub-periods of the same length (with the 
exception of the last one) and represent years of macroeconomic stability, relative to the 
Argentine standards.3 Of course, all years have some peculiarities that make them non-
strictly comparable, but it should be noticed that the distribution appears to be rather stable 
around those selected years.4 Table 2.5 shows changes in inequality measures in the five 
sub-periods. For most measures the greater increase was between 1992 and 1998, followed 
by 1998-2002 or 1974-1980, depending on the index. Note that in the 80s household 
inequality increased, while earnings and wage dispersion went down.  
 
Lorenz dominance analysis confirms the increasing pattern in inequality. From all the 
possible combinations of the six selected years by pairs, in all but 1980-1986 there is 
Lorenz dominance of the first year over the second for the distribution of equivalized 
household income. Figure 2.2 shows that the Lorenz curves for the six selected years do not 
cross.5 The graph is illustrative of the greater distributional shift during the 90s. The 
estimated density functions of Figure 2.3 are also clear in showing strong distributional 
movements. The densities have become progressively flatter with a thicker left tail, 
implying higher inequality and poverty.   
 
So far all statistics refer to the GBA, since the EPH was initially conducted only in that 
area, and slowly extended to other urban areas. Table 2.6 shows statistics for the aggregate 
of 28 urban areas covered by the EPH, but restricting the analysis to 1992-2003. The 
increasing pattern shown for GBA in Figure 2.1 is also noticeable for all urban Argentina. 
Notice that the increase in inequality in the 90s was somewhat higher in GBA: while the 
Gini for the distribution of equivalized household income grew 10 points in that city 
between 1992 and 2002, the increase was 8 points for the aggregate of all urban areas.6  
 
In Table 2.7 we show the Gini coefficient for the distribution of several household income 
variables both in GBA and Argentina for selected years. Columns (i) to (v) consider 
different adult equivalent scales, column (vi) restricts income to labor sources, column (vii) 
considers total household income without adjusting for family size, while columns (viii) to 
                                                 
3 In October 2002 the macroeconomic crisis of 2001-2002 seemed to have ended.   
4 With data taken from Altimir (1986), Gasparini (1999) reports Ginis for the 50s and 60s similar to that of 
1974.  
5 Lorenz curves for 1980-1986 cross at the bottom tail, but that cannot be seen in the graph.  
6 See the web page of CEDLAS (www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar/cedlas.htm) for inequality statistics for all 
urban areas.  
 5 
(xi) restrict the analysis to people in the same age bracket to control for life-cycle factors. 
Results do not significantly differ from the ones depicted in Figure 2.1. 
 
All previous inequality measures are computed from the EPH, which is a sample of the 
population. Measures are then subject to the sample variability problem. In Table 2.8 we 
show standard errors for the Gini coefficients of the equivalized household income 
distribution in GBA.7 Although changes between (especially subsequent) years are not 
always statistically significant, the inequality pattern is quite robust to the sample 
variability problem.  
 
2.2. Argentina in Latin America  
 
Argentina has traditionally been one of the most equal countries in Latin America, along 
with Costa Rica and Uruguay (Londoño and Székely, 2000). The presence of a large 
middle-class was a distinctive feature of Argentina’s economy. Figure 2.4 shows the Gini 
coefficient for the distribution of equivalized income for most Latin American economies. 
In the early 90s and despite 15 years of increasing inequality, Argentina remained as one of 
the low-inequality countries in the region.  
 
The Argentina’s distributional story in the last decade was substantially different from that 
of the rest of the region. Although inequality increased in many countries, especially in 
South America, changes have been small compared to the ones experienced by Argentina.8 
The second panel of Figure 2.4 suggests that Argentina no longer belongs to the low-
inequality group within LAC. It is interesting the comparison with Uruguay: once almost 
identical, the distributions of these two neighbor countries are now clearly different, after 
three decades of relative distributional stability in Uruguay and turbulence in Argentina.  
 
2.3. Poverty  
 
The distributional changes reported so far had profound consequences in terms of poverty. 
Figure 2.5 shows the poverty headcount ratio for the GBA area. While poverty was close to 
developed-countries records in 1980, it reached developing-countries figures by 2002. 
Poverty slowly increased during the first half of the 80s, and skyrocketed during the 
hyperinflation crisis. After a sharp fall in the early 90s, the poverty headcount ratio 
increased from 18% to 26% between 1992 and 1998, despite strong economic growth. The 
recent crisis generated an unprecedented increase in poverty that reached more than 50%. 
Although it is likely that most of this increase will be undone as the economy overcome the 
crisis,9 the headcount ratio would still be at very high levels compared to historical records, 
and considering Argentina’s economic potential, and even current levels of GDP. Notice 
from Table 2.9 that the increase in poverty is even deeper when considering not only the 
number of individuals below the poverty line (FGT(0) or headcount ratio), but also their 
                                                 
7 Standard errors and confidence interval are computed by bootstrapping techniques. Standard errors for other 
indices are available from the author upon request.  
8 The raise in the Gini in Argentina was almost double the one in Venezuela, which ranks second according to 
inequality increases (Gasparini, 2003). 
9 The official poverty line is currently close to the mode of the distribution: a small improvement in economic 
conditions would imply a large fall in the official measures of poverty.  
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income relative to the poverty line (FGT(1) and (FGT(2)). The increase in poverty is not a 
phenomenon restricted to the Greater Buenos Aires area. Gasparini (2002) reports similar 
increasing poverty patterns for most urban areas since 1992.  
 
2.4. Aggregate welfare  
 
Despite the raise in inequality, aggregate welfare may increase if, for instance, income goes 
up for all quantiles of the distribution. By showing growth-incidence curves Figure 2.6 
suggests that in none of the analyzed periods that was the case.10 Actually, real income fell 
for the bottom percentiles of the equivalized household income distribution in all the 5 
periods considered. All the growth-incidence curves have a positive “slope”, indicating 
non-poor growth. Table 2.10 shows the average growth-rates by quintile and reinforces the 
idea of unbalanced growth. The poor have performed worse than the rich both in 
expansions and in recessions.   
 
Figure 2.7 shows the value of aggregate welfare for different functions, setting 1980=100. 
All functions report a substantial welfare fall during the “lost decade” of the 80s, due to the 
decrease in mean income and the unequalizing distributional changes of the late 80s. 
Welfare unambiguously increased in the first half of the 90s (at least for the value 
judgments implicit in the functions considered in the Figure), fueled by strong growth, and 
despite the raise in inequality. The period 1994-1998 is interesting, since mean income 
moderately increased and the distribution became substantially more unequal. These 
movements generate divergent patterns in the assessment of welfare according to different 
value judgments. While for an inequality-indifferent value judgment (labeled as Bentham in 
the Figure) welfare increased in that period, for those value judgments attaching more 
weight to the bottom tail of the distribution (e.g. Atkinson (2)), welfare substantially 
decreased. The recent recession and crisis period 1999-2002 does not generate any 
discrepancy: as income fell and the distribution became more unequal aggregate welfare 
dramatically decreased for any function considered.  
 
It is interesting to stress the relevance that the attitudes toward inequality have in the views 
of the economy. Figure 2.7 shows that while the assessment of the performance of the 
Argentina’s economy during the 90s was clearly positive for someone indifferent to 
inequality considerations, the evaluation for other value judgments was neutral, and for 
some other clearly negative.   
 
2.5. Polarization and mobility  
 
Polarization and mobility are two other dimensions of equity that have recently received 
attention in the literature. Polarization refers to homogeneous clusters that antagonize each 
other. Table 2.11 shows the Wolfson (1994) and Esteban, Gradín and Ray (1999) indices of 
bipolarization for GBA 1974-2002, and Argentina 1992-2002. Polarization and inequality 
can go in different directions. This was not the case in Argentina, where the distribution 
became more unequal and more polarized at the same time.  
                                                 
10 We rescaled incomes to match National Account disposable income. Not making this adjustment implies a 
more dramatic fall in real incomes for all the population over the three last decades. 
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Inequality may be seen as not so disturbing when mobility is high or at least increasing. A 
mobility study ideally requires panel data, which is absent in the Argentine case.11 Table 
2.12 reports results for educational mobility - an imperfect substitute of a living-standards 
mobility study. Following Andersen (2001) we show an educational mobility index, 
defined as 1 minus the proportion of the variance of the schooling gap that is explained by 
family background (parental education and income), where the schooling gap measures 
years of missing education. According to table 2.12 there are no signs of increasing 
educational mobility in the country in the last three decades.  
  
3. Exploring the direct determinants of distributional changes  
Income measured in the EPH, as in most household surveys, comes mostly from labor 
sources. Returns to capital, benefits and rents were surely modified by all the economic 
changes that Argentina has gone through. However, their distributional impact is not well 
captured in the statistics, since these income sources are seriously under-reported. In this 
section we explore the direct determinants of changes in the distribution of household labor 
income in GBA.12 We start by looking at the results of simple wage equations.   
 
Figure 3.1 shows the wage-education profiles that results from estimating Mincer equations 
controlling for sample selection. Each line indicates for different educational levels the 
expected hourly wage for a male household head, aged 40, married, with two children, and 
not attending school. Returns to education are always positive. Returns decreased for 
secondary and college graduates between 1980 and 1986, and remained remarkable 
constant, when comparing 1986 and 1992. In contrast, the second panel of the Figure shows 
a substantial convexification of the wage-education profile in the 90s, which implies a 
widening wage gap, particularly between college-educated people and the rest.  
 
The Mincer equations reveal another relevant phenomenon: the dispersion of the residual 
term remained rather constant in the 80s, while it became substantially increasing in the last 
decade. Figure 3.2 documents this fact by showing the standard deviation of the error term 
for regressions of hourly wages for household heads, spouses and other persons in the 
household. The increasing dispersion in the unobservables has been interpreted in the 
literature as an increase in the returns to some unobserved productive “assets” in the labor 
market, like ability, school quality, or connections, and it is consistent with the raise in the 
returns to formal education, the other relevant asset for achieving labor market success.  
 
Hours of work have also changed in an unbalanced fashion across educational groups. 
While unskilled workers now work fewer hours than before, skilled workers have increased 
their time in the labor market. Figure 3.3 documents these divergent patterns by showing 
                                                 
11 The EPH is a rotating panel where a household remains in the sample just one year and a half.  
12 Although the geographical constraint certainly limits the scope of the conclusions in this and the next 
sections, it should be noticed that (i) one third of the population of Argentina lives in GBA, (ii) there were no 
significant migratory movements (neither in population nor in economic activity) for the last 30 years, and 
(iii) changes in the labor structure for the rest of urban Argentina are similar to those of GBA since the late 
80s, when data is available for more urban areas. 
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predicted hours from a Tobit model. Changes were small during the 80s; instead they 
became very significant and clearly unequalizing in the following decade.       
 
Inequality has increased in the 90s along with an unprecedented growth in unemployment. 
The unemployment rate was around 2.5% between 1974 and 1980, climbed to around 5% 
in one decade, and then in a few years jumped to around 15%. Actually, unemployment 
increased to almost 20% during the Tequila crisis and the 2001/02 crisis. Figure 3.4 shows 
that the increase in the “equilibrium” unemployment rate from 5% to 15% is basically due 
to a large increase in labor market participation. Women and youths have moved massively 
to the labor market but faced an economy with a rigid employment rate. The problem 
became even worse in recession times when employment temporarily fell. When 
unemployment is basically the consequence of increasing labor market participation, 
instead of falling employment, its effect on inequality or poverty is less obvious. If for 
instance a youth enter the labor force but is unable to find a job, the unemployment rate 
goes up, but the income distribution remains unchanged (in both labor situations the 
youth’s earnings are zero).    
 
A microsimulation analysis can shed light over the distributional impact of the factors 
discussed so far. We model wages and hours of work as parametric functions of observable 
characteristics, and interpret the residuals of the regressions as the effect of unobservable 
factors. For instance, the individual i´s hourly wage in t can be written as ittitit Xw εβ +=  
where X is a vector of observable characteristics (typically age, sex and education), β is a 
vector of parameters, and ε is an error term. The basic idea of the microsimulations is to 
find the counterfactual distribution of w that would be generated in a given period t1 if some 
of the right-hand-side elements of the previous equation took the observed values in t2 and 
the rest remained at their values in t1. The difference between the real distribution in time t1 
and the counterfactual one characterizes the distributional impact of the factors modified in 
the simulation.  
 
In Table 3.1 we present the results of applying this methodology to characterize changes in 
the distribution among workers of hourly wages and earnings, and the distribution among 
individuals of equivalized household labor income between 1980 and 2002.13 We 
investigate the effect of changes in the returns to education, gender and experience in terms 
of hourly wages (columns (ii) to (v)) by changing the corresponding coefficients 
(educational dummies, male dummy, and age and age squared) in the wage equation. We 
trace the effect of these changes not only on the distribution of wages, but also on the 
distribution of earnings and equivalized household labor income. In column (v) we simulate 
wages in time t1 by assuming the distribution of unobservables estimated in time t2. We also 
investigate the impact of changes in the parameters of the educational dummies in a (Tobit) 
hours-of-work equation, separating out the effect on hours of work (column (vi)) and 
employment (column (vii)). Finally, to compute column (viii) we simulate the educational 
structure observed in t2 on the population in t1, keeping the parameters and unobservables 
fixed at their values in t1. Table 3.1 shows the average results of these exercises changing 
alternatively the base year. Results should be read as follows. The Gini coefficient of the 
                                                 
13 The methodology to implement these decompositions closely follows Gasparini et al. (2003). We could not 
include 1974, because data limitations (e.g. absence of hours of work in the dataset). 
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earnings distribution changed 7.3 points between 1992 and 1998. If only the educational 
dummies in the hourly wage equation had changed between those years, the Gini would 
have increased on average 2.9 points, which implies a sizeable unequalizing effect of the 
increase in the returns to education on the earnings distribution.  
 
Table 3.1 suggests some interesting results. The change in the returns to education was 
equalizing in the 80s, and contributed to a fall in wage and earnings inequality. This effect 
was reversed in the 90s: the increase in the returns to education played a very significant 
role in rising inequality in the last decade. The returns to unobservable factors in terms of 
wages, and the returns to education in terms of hours of work played in the same direction: 
slightly equalizing in the 80s and substantially unequalizing in the 90s. It seems that 
changes in the gender wage gap and the returns to experience did not play a significant role 
in shaping the income distribution. Although Argentina experienced a large increase in 
unemployment, the employment rate has not significantly changed over most of the period, 
which accounts for the negligible effect reported in column (vii). Finally, changes in the 
educational structure of the population were mainly unequalizing, as the size of the college 
group expanded.14  
 
The analysis of this section suggests that unskilled workers -both in terms of formal 
education and in terms of unobservable factors- have lost in terms of hourly wages and 
hours of work during the period 1992-2002, and that these changes have had a very 
significant role in shaping the distribution of hourly wages, earnings, and household 
income. In the next section we link these phenomena with the economic changes that have 
occurred in Argentina, in particular the process of economic integration to the global 
economy.  
 
4. Integration and inequality  
In this section we describe the process of integration of Argentina to the global economy, 
review the theoretical links between this process and the rise in inequality, and provide 
evidence on these links based on own estimates and results from the recent literature.  
 
4.1. The process of integration 
 
For many decades Argentina was a rather closed economy both regarding the goods and 
capital markets. With the exception of a short period of liberalization in the late 70s, the 
economy traditionally had low levels of trade and financial integration and low rates of 
absorption of production and organizational technologies. After a timid movement toward 
more openness in the late 80s, the new administration that took power after the 
hyperinflation of 1989 implemented in only a few years a broad range of market-based 
reforms that dramatically changed the integration of Argentina to the international markets. 
In just a few years, Argentina, formerly a typical closed economy, became a member of the 
global economy. 
                                                 
14 The college group is still small in size, with average earnings far from the overall mean, and with high 
within wage dispersion. These characteristics likely imply an unequalizing effect as the size of this group 
increases.   
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On the one hand, tariffs were substantially reduced and most barriers to international trade 
were eliminated. Additionally, the implementation of Mercosur, a regional trade agreement 
with Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay, significantly increased trade with these neighbor 
countries. The share of goods imports in the GDP dramatically increased from 4% in the 
80s to more than 10% in the 90s. Also, its structure changed: the share of capital goods in 
total imports increased around 10 percentage points in the early 90s.  
 
Regarding capital markets, although most legal constraints on capital movements had 
already been removed in the 70s, the macroeconomic and institutional instability of the 80s 
isolated Argentina from the international credit circuit. The perception by foreign investors 
of greater economic and institutional stability stimulated capital inflows since 1991. Keys 
to this change were the Convertibility Plan that pegged the peso to the dollar and prevented 
the government from financing with monetary emission, and a range of market-based 
reforms including a massive process of privatizations and deregulations. The favorable 
international financial conditions also contributed to the massive inflow of foreign capitals, 
which added to the substantial increase of the gross fixed investment in the 90s compared 
to previous decades. Foreign direct investment as a share of GDP increased from an 
average of 0.4% in the period 1970-1990 to 1.6% in the period 1991-1997 (Martinez et al., 
1998). The impact of foreign investment is clear in the structure of fixed investment: the 
share of foreign durable equipment for production in the fixed gross investment increased 
from 10% to 30% in the early 90s. Around 47% of total direct foreign investment in 1992-
1996 went to the service sectors, attracted by the privatization process (Kulfas and Hecker, 
1998). The rest went mainly to extractive activities and the manufacturing sector.  
 
The import-substituting industrialization policies in place for decades in Argentina were not 
successful in terms of technological progress. The industrialization process was 
characterized by large productive inefficiencies, scarce innovations and slow incorporation 
of new technologies. In contrast, the reforms of the 90s promoted a substantial change in 
productivity and technological advance. FIEL (2002) documents the increase in TFP during 
the 90s using both a growth-regression and a micro-accounting approach. The significant 
increase in productivity in the 90s contrasts with the frustrating experience of the 80s.  
 
It is difficult to find measures of technological progress, in particular covering long periods 
of time.15 However, given that technology is frequently incorporated into new capital 
goods,16 especially those from developed countries, the noticeable increase in private 
investment as a proportion of GDP (44% between the 80s and the 90s), the fall in the 
average age of the capital stock (from 8.8 years in 1989 to 5.9 years in 1996), and the 
increase in the imports of capital goods (30% of total investment in 1999 from a level of 
8% in 1983-1990), suggest a strong process of new technology incorporation.  
 
This process was encouraged by several factors. First, both deregulation of many domestic 
markets and the removal of barriers to international trade forced private firms to seek the 
                                                 
15 The Encuesta Tecnológica that includes many questions on technology and productivity was introduced in 
1996, and implemented only twice, 1996 and 2001. Data however is not available for the 2001 survey yet.  
16 See Grossman and Helpman (1994). 
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productivity gains necessary to stay in business.17 Second, the openness of the Argentine 
economy just in a moment of increasing globalization and diffusion of new communication 
technologies induced the access to state-of-the-art production technologies. Third, the price 
of capital goods dramatically fell at the beginning of the 90s following favorable tariff 
treatment for capital imports and the real exchange rate appreciation. As suggested, 
imported capital goods are an important vehicle for technology transfer. Finally, as it was 
mentioned above, foreign direct investment greatly increased in the 90s.18 Besides 
promoting improvements in the management and international marketing of domestic 
firms, it tends to favor the access to foreign technologies: by keeping the control over the 
use and benefits by the owner, direct foreign investment eliminates the usual resistance to 
technological transfer towards economies with a weak protection of property rights. 
Likewise, through the contact with providers and clients, the firms receiving foreign 
investment - for example, the local subsidiaries of multinational firms- generate knowledge 
spillovers over other domestic firms.19 
 
The core of the whole process of reforms -stabilization plan, trade and financial 
liberalization, privatizations, and deregulations- were carried out in no more than five 
years, with basically no gradual schedule to allow the private sector adjustment to the new 
circumstances. On the contrary, many public subsidies to the productive sector were 
reduced or eliminated, and some measures of flexibility in the labor market were 
introduced. The early 90s were years with a lot of action in terms of changes in the 
organizational and productive structure of the firms. In contrast to other economies that 
gradually incorporated new technologies (either because they were already open, like most 
developed countries, or because the openness process was gradual, like several LAC 
countries), it is likely that Argentina experienced a true technological shock, as firms used 
to certain technologies for decades suddenly changed to state-of-the-art techniques.  
 
Data on the pace, speed and depth of the reforms is not easy to find. There have been some 
efforts in computing indices of the reforms (Lora (1997) and Morley et al. (1999)). In these 
studies Argentina is identified as a high-speed reformer in the early 90s. Figure 4.1 shows 
data from Morley et al. (1999) on indices for reforms on three areas closely related to 
integration and technology incorporation: international finance, trade and privatizations. In 
all these areas changes in Argentina seem to have occurred more rapidly than in the rest of 
the countries. This is evident from the figure, even when (i) the index for trade reform does 
not include quantitative restrictions, which were very relevant in Argentina and were 
mostly removed in the early 90s, and it does not properly capture the formation of the 
Mercosur, and (ii) the index for privatizations depends (negatively) on the value-added in 
state-owned enterprises: had the index been defined in terms of volume of sales the 
assessment of the depth of the Argentine privatizations would have been greater (see Lora, 
1997).   
 
                                                 
17 Consistent with that, there exists evidence on a stronger increase in productivity in the private sector 
relative to the public sector, and in tradable goods relative to nontradable goods (FIEL (2002), and Gay 
(1998)). 
18 See Katz (1999) among others.  
19 See IFC (1997) and Blomstrom and Kokko (1996). 
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4.2. Integration and distribution: theoretical links  
 
The effects of increasing economic openness on the within-country distribution of well-
being has long been a concern for economists and policy-makers. In the last decades this 
topic has occupied a central position in the economic debate, first as a consequence of  
rising earnings inequality in the United States and England during the 80s and 90s, and 
more recently as part of the debate on the possible drawbacks of globalization.  
 
Increased openness can affect the income distribution through multiple channels: sector 
reallocations and changes in the use of factors within industries are the two most discussed 
in the literature. When a country carries out a trade liberalization reform, domestic prices 
change, which generates a reallocation of resources across sectors, which in turn affect 
factor prices (the famous Stolper-Samuelson theorem in play). If, as some researchers find, 
Argentina were a country abundant in natural resources and skilled labor, relative to the 
world average and to its main trade partners in the Mercosur,20 trade liberalization would 
imply a shift towards production and employment in sectors that use those factors more 
intensively. That in turn would trigger a raise in the return to natural resources and a 
widening of the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers.21  
 
Greater integration to the world markets for an economy like Argentina can affect 
inequality through a second channel. As argued above, increased openness implies the fall 
in the price of capital goods and the introduction of new technologies. Given that capital is 
more complementary of skilled labor than of unskilled labor, and that new technologies are 
mostly skilled labor intensive, we expect that integration brings about an increase in the 
demand for skilled labor in all productive sectors, and hence an increase in the skill 
premium.22  
 
The effects of integration on poverty depend on its effect on growth and inequality. While 
there is a large literature on the positive effects of openness on growth (Bourguignon et al. 
(2002), Michaley et al. (1991), Sachs and Warner (1995)), we have just discussed the 
potential unequalizing effect of integration on the income distribution. However, and 
although there are opposing views, there is a relatively wide consensus in that more 
integration to the world economy on average implies higher income or faster growth, and 
that growth, more than anything, is behind the successful stories of poverty reduction.23  
 
The empirical study of the links between globalization and distribution faces two 
formidable problems in the case of Argentina. On the one hand there are severe data 
limitations to implement many research strategies that have been applied to other (mostly 
developed) countries. Secondly, all sorts of economic reforms were carried out in just a few 
years, so it becomes difficult to single out the effect of each of the reforms on the income 
                                                 
20 See Cristini (1999) and Porto (2000).  
21 See Wood (1994) and Leamer (1995) for this argument applied to the case of the US.  
22 See Acemoglu (2002) and Krusell et al. (2000) for models of these arguments.  
23 See Berry (2002) and Rodrik (2001) for views that challenge this “consensus”.  Anyway as Rodrik puts it 
“no country has developed successfully by turning its back on international trade or long-term capital flows”. 
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distribution. In the rest of this section we contribute to the understanding of distributional 
changes with some evidence, and report evidence from the recent literature. 
 
4.3. Between and within factor reallocations   
 
The sectoral structure of the economy has substantially changed in Argentina in the last 
three decades. Table 4.1 shows the share of each sector of activity in total hours of work in 
the Greater Buenos Aires area. The most notable change in the labor structure since 1974 
has been the fall in employment in the manufacturing industry, and the increase in public 
sector and in professional and business services employment (see Figure 4.1). While 38% 
of work hours were in the manufacturing industry in 1974, that value dropped to just 19% 
in 1998, and 15% in 2002. On the other hand, while in 1974 21% of hours were in the more 
skilled-intensive sectors of professional and business services and the government, that 
share rose to 39% in 1998, and 46% in 2002. These changes have occurred over the whole 
period under analysis, although the drop in low-tech manufacturing industry and the 
increase in professional services were deeper during the two periods of liberalization (74-80 
and 92-98). The share of employment in public administration, education and health 
increased particularly during 86-92 and 98-02.  
 
These patterns do not substantially varied as we divide the population of workers by skills. 
Workers with less than high school have lost jobs (or hours of work) in the manufacturing 
sector over the last three decades. While some have joined the pool of the unemployed, 
others have found new jobs in other sectors, especially in the public sector, and in the 
wholesale and retail sectors. Semi-skilled workers (those with a high school degree) have 
also lost jobs in the manufacturing industry, while found employment in commerce, 
utilities and the public sector. The industry downgrading also affected skilled labor, 
although less than it impacted unskilled labor. College graduates have moved in particular 
to the professional and business services sector during 74-80 and 92-98, and to the public 
sector during 86-92.  
 
The educational structure of the labor market has been substantially changing in Argentina 
at least during the last three decades, according to the results of table 4.2. While the share 
of workers with less than high school in aggregate labor was 67% in 1974, that share 
dramatically fell to 32.7% in 2002. On the other hand, the share of college graduates rose 
from 10.3% to 32.4% in the same period. These changes are mainly due to an education 
upgrading of the population, but also due to the increasing difficulties for the unskilled to 
find employment.  
 
Table 4.3 shows the share of each type of labor by sector of activity. Compared to 
professional services and the public sector, the manufacturing industry is intensive in 
unskilled labor. For instance, while in 1998 61% of workers in the low-tech industry were 
unskilled, only 12% were in that group in the business sector. The sectoral employment 
changes reported in table 4.1 were then clearly in favor of skilled labor. The public sector 
(public administration, health and education) and the private sector have alternated in 
shifting the relative demand for skilled labor: it was the professional and business sector in 
74-80 and 92-98, and the public sector in 80-86 and 98-02. Both sectors demand different 
types of workers: the public sector heavily demands teachers, nurses and policemen who 
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mostly belong to the upper educational group, but have less skills, at least in terms of years 
of education, and earn lower wages than the average in that group. Hence the impact on 
earning inequality is likely to be smaller when the public sector expands than when the 
professional and business sector grows.  
 
Recall from last section that the relative wage for skilled labor slightly decreased in the 80s. 
Table 4.3 reports a more intensive use of this factor in most sectors. In contrast, the wage 
premium for skilled workers significantly increased in the 90s. However, nearly all sectors 
rose the employment share of this factor. This movement is consistent with an increase in 
the relative productivity of skilled labor brought about either by the increased use of 
complementary factors in the production process (capital) or by skilled-biased 
technological change. A third possibility has been mentioned in the literature: some skilled 
workers may occupy unskilled positions and earn wages corresponding to the productivity 
in those jobs (e.g. architects driving a taxi). If that occurs, the factor change in some sectors 
may be overestimated. 
 
As an exploratory analysis we decompose the changes in the share of each of the three 
types of labor into (i) changes due to transformations in the sectoral structure of 
employment (presumably a consequence of changes in the production structure driven by 
trade liberalization), and (ii) changes due to variations in the intensity of use of different 
types of labor within each sector (presumably the consequence of the drop in the price of 
capital goods and/or biased technological change).24 This decomposition, whose results are 
shown in Table 4.4 and Figure 4.3, provides a sign of the relevance of each of the two 
channels discussed in the previous section.  
 
The between effect in the first panel indicates that sectoral changes have favored college 
graduates over the last three decades. On the contrary, workers with less than high school 
faced declining demand due to the contraction in those sectors that use unskilled labor more 
intensively. Notice that these effects were stronger between 1986 and 1992, a period where 
employment in the public sector increased, while it substantially fell in the manufacturing 
industry and in unskilled service sectors.  
 
The within effects in the second panel of Table 4.4 have the same signs of the between 
effects. Firms have changed the way they produce, demanding more skilled labor and less 
unskilled labor. This phenomenon has been taking place at least since the 70s. The period 
with the largest positive impact on college graduates employment was 92-98, which is 
consistent with the story of new capital incorporation and skilled-biased technological 
change after the reforms. However, this effect is also significant during the 80s, a decade of 
stagnation in investment and technological progress. It is interesting to notice that figures in 
the second panel are generally higher than those in the first panel, suggesting that within 
effects have been stronger than between effects.  
 
The last panel in Table 4.4 shows the overall effect in employment of between and within 
sectoral changes. Relative employment of the unskilled has dramatically fallen both due to 
a falling share of unskilled-labor–intensive industries and especially because of less use of 
                                                 
24 See Bound and Johnson (1992) among others for similar decompositions. 
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that factor in all sectors. On the contrary, employment of skilled workers has increased 
through both channels. The 90s do not look so different from the 80s from this 
decomposition. Two distinctive factors of the 90s are the stronger positive within effect on 
college graduates, and an overall poorer performance of the semi-skilled, relative to the 
80s.   
 
A plausible, but certainly not unique, interpretation of these results is the following. The 
80s combine absence of technological change, and an expansion of the public sector. That 
expansion did not translate into a higher wage premium, probably because (i) it did not shift 
the demand for skilled labor too much given the peculiarities of the public sector labor 
demand commented above, (ii) labor institutions were clearly more active in the 80s than in 
other periods, and (iii) there was a jump in skilled labor supply in the second half of the 
80s, due to the increasing attendance to universities brought about by democracy in 1983. 
Given the fall in the wage premium most sectors increased the relative use of skilled labor, 
which accounts for a positive within effect for college graduates in Table 4.4.  
 
The story for the two liberalization periods (74-80 and the 90s) was different: changes 
toward skilled-intensive private sectors and skilled-biased technological change expanded 
the demand for skilled labor, and hence the wage premium went up. Weak labor institutions 
favored this increase. Despite the growth in the wage premium, firms used more skilled 
labor, given the productivity upgrading. The within effect was larger and more economy-
widespread in the 90s than in the late 70s, which is consistent with a stronger process of 
new capital and technology incorporation.  
 
4.4. Trade, investment and technology  
 
Motivated by the strong economic and distributional changes experienced by Argentina in 
the 90s several authors have tried to connect the economic reforms to the increase in 
inequality and poverty. Due to data constraints the existing literature has almost exclusively 
concentrated on the effect of trade liberalization on income inequality. The general 
conclusion is that more openness implied a wider wage gap, but that this effect can explain 
only a small fraction of the total increase in the wage premium.  
 
García Swartz (1998) shows that relative wages and prices evolved according to the 
predictions of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. The author however casts doubts over the 
hypothesis of changes in the productive structure of the economy (sectoral changes) as the 
main reason behind the distributional changes. Using a different methodology Galiani and 
Sanguinetti (2003) share that conclusion. They regress the log of individual hourly wage as 
a function of variables that interact education with import penetration in the sector where 
the individual works, and a set of controls. They find that in sectors where import 
penetration was deeper, the wage gap between skilled and unskilled became wider. 
However, this factor can explain only 10% of the total change in the wage premium. 
Cicowiez (2002) also finds an unequalizing but very small effect of simulating the fall in 
tariffs during the liberalization process of the early 90s in a computable general equilibrium 
model. Porto (2000) finds a somewhat higher distributional effect by estimating the factor 
contents of international trade and simulating relative wages in autarky.  
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Trade may modify the real income distribution by changing not only factor prices, but also 
prices of goods and services. Porto (2002) finds an equalizing distributional effect of 
liberalization from the consumption side by inspecting changes in relative prices and the 
bundles consumed by households from the Encuesta de Gastos e Ingresos de los Hogares 
1996/7. He finds that the poor consume relatively more tradable goods than the rich do, and 
concludes that they were the main beneficiaries of the fall in tariffs when considering only 
this channel.  
 
To take a deeper look at the distributional effects of trade liberalization and technological 
change on relative wages, we extend the study of Galiani and Sanguinetti (2003) by adding 
a variable that interacts the worker’s education with a measure of capital investment in her 
sector. Details of this analysis are in a companion paper (Acosta and Gasparini, 2003). In 
particular, we estimate the following regression  
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where wi is individual’s i hourly wage; Eig is the educational dummy for level g; and Tit is a 
time dummy (= 1 if the individual i is observed in year t). The variable mi is the logarithm 
of imports penetration over value-added in the sector to which the individual i belongs, 
while ki denotes the log of capital accumulation over sectoral value-added. We include in 
the regressions the usual set of controls (age, age squared, gender, tenure) and fixed effects 
by year, sector and city. Individual data on wages, education and control variables are taken 
from the EPH for all urban areas in Argentina from 1992 to 1999. Import penetration data 
by sector is taken from the External Trade Data-Intal (IDB) while sectoral value-added data 
was obtained from the Secretary of Economic Policy. A panel dataset on investment in 
machinery and equipment by industry released by the Department of Industry is our main 
source of information for capital accumulation.  
 
As they interact with the educational dummy variables, the model allows a differential 
effect by skill for both imports penetration and capital accumulation. Given that new 
technology is incorporated into new capital, and physical capital is more complementary 
with skilled labor than with unskilled labor, we expect that the βk be increasing in the 
educational groups. Table 4.5 results are consistent with these expectations: in all the 
estimated models the coefficients for both the capital investment and the import penetration 
variables interacting with the college dummy are significantly higher than the coefficients 
for the variables interacting with the other two educational groups, implying a widening 
wage gap as import penetration and capital investment increase. Panel A in Figure 4.4 
shows the estimated wage gap for a male worker aged 40 with low tenure in GBA, as 
capital incorporation increases in the sector where he works. Panel B repeats the exercise as 
import penetration goes up. In both cases the support in the horizontal axis represents the 
range of variation of investment and imports in the dataset. From the graphs the wage 
premium appears to be more sensitive to changes in capital investment. In fact, Acosta and 
Gasparini (2003) find that import penetration accounts for 15% of the actual change in the 
wage premium, while capital incorporation explains around 60%.  
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The greater relevance of the capital/technology channel over the trade channel is also found 
in studies for other countries. In a survey of the literature for the US Katz and Autor (1999) 
conclude that trade explains around 20 percent of the increase in inequality, while skilled-
biased technological change explains the remaining 80 percent. Behrman et al. (2003) use 
household survey microdata on wage differentials by schooling levels for 18 Latin 
American countries for the period 1977-1998 combined with policy indices, and find that 
on average liberalizing policies have had a strong positive effect on wage differentials, 
although that effect tends to fade fairly rapidly. They conclude that “technological progress 
rather than trade has been the mechanism through which the disequalizing effects have 
been operating”. Sánchez-Páramo and Schady (2003) reach a similar conclusion using 
repeated cross-sections of household surveys. They stress an important point: although the 
direct effect of trade on wage inequality may be small, trade is an important mechanism for 
technology transmission. They show that “changes in the volume and R&D intensity of 
imports  are significantly related to changes in the demand for more skilled workers in 
Latin America”. 
 
Summing up, although none of the pieces of evidence shown in this section is per se 
sufficiently conclusive or convincing, nearly all of them point to the same conclusions. The 
integration of Argentina to the global economy accelerated in the beginning of the 90s 
seems to have had a significant unequalizing impact on the wage gap between skilled and 
unskilled workers. The direct impact of sectoral reallocations after trade liberalization 
seems to have been minor. The (scarce) evidence on the distributional impact of the 
increase in capital investment and skilled-biased technological change suggests effects of a 
larger magnitude.  
 
4.5. Other factors   
 
As it was stated before, many changes have occurred during the 90s beyond those 
mentioned so far that might have affected the income distribution. The strength of some 
labor institutions have varied over time in Argentina. Two of the periods of greater 
distributional changes coincide with weak labor institutions: the military regime banned 
unions during the second half of the 70s, while as a consequence of an alliance with the 
government unions remained quiet during the 90s. Also in both periods the minimum wage 
became non-binding. Unfortunately, there is not quantitative evidence on the effect of these 
institutional factors on inequality.  
 
The reforms of the 90s increased the returns to non-labor factors. Being Argentina a 
country with large endowments of natural resources, trade openness generated an increase 
in the returns to these factors. Also, the pro-market reforms, especially the reduction of the 
government’s role in the economy, encouraged private business and increased aggregate 
profits. The substantial raise in total factor productivity would have also contributed to feed 
entrepreneurial benefits. The share of non-labor sources in the GDP increased from 36% in 
1993 to 43% in 2000 (DNCN, 2003). The share of capital, rents and profits in the EPH is 
much lower and has increased substantially less (from 2.1% to 2.8% in the same period). 
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Since capital income is more concentrated in rich households this fact implies that both the 
level and the increase in recorded income inequality are underestimated.25  
 
Demographic factors have not been absent in shaping Argentina’s household income 
distribution. During the last two decades fertility decisions have varied significantly and not 
uniformly along the income distribution. The average number of children under 12 per 
household in the GBA in the bottom quintile of the parental income distribution was 1.33 in 
1974 and 1.95 in 1998. The corresponding figures for the top quintile were 1.24 and 0.97. 
This divergent pattern in fertility decisions across income strata was stronger in the 80s. 
Using microsimulations Marchionni and Gasparini (2003) conclude that the increase of the 
family size in low-income households significantly contributed to the observed growth in 
poverty and inequality in that decade. The impact on the distribution in the 90s was smaller.   
 
4.6. Argentina vis-a-vis the rest of LAC  
 
As it was argued in section 2 the distributional performance of Argentina has been 
significantly worse than in the rest of the region. Although this paper is not focused on 
comparative issues, it is possible to sketch some possible explanations for these different 
patterns. One plausible reason is the faster pace at which Argentina has integrated to the 
global economy. A sudden technological and organizational shock has a deeper impact than 
a slow process of technology incorporation with more time to do training and reallocation. 
The same applies for the economic transformations that follow a sudden and deep trade 
liberalization process. There is evidence that Argentina was a high-speed reformer in the 
early 90s, although the evidence on the effect of this speed on wage differentials is still 
scarce and mixed.26  
 
A second reason refers to the fact that the pre-reform economic structure was significantly 
different in Argentina from most of the rest of LAC. Being a more industrialized economy, 
technological changes and sector reallocations driven by liberalization probably had a 
stronger impact in the structure of wages and employment than in other less 
developed/more agrarian economies. Additionally, compared to most countries in LAC 
Argentina has a significantly larger share of skilled labor (see Figure 4.5), which may have 
contributed to a faster and more widespread incorporation of skilled-biased technological 
innovations.27 Also, this different factor endowment likely implied greater price changes 
and reallocations against unskilled labor-intensive sectors after trade openness with 
countries relative abundant in unskilled labor (e.g. China and Brazil).  
 
The demographic factors were also particularly unequalizing in Argentina, compared to the 
rest of LAC. Figure 4.6 shows the ratio in the number of children under 12 per household 
between the bottom and top quintiles of the parental income distribution. That ratio 
increased in Argentina more than in any other country in the region.  
                                                 
25 The increase in mean income in the 90s is also probably underestimated for this reason. Actually there is a 
serious discrepancy on income changes between the EPH and National Accounts.  
26 Behrman et al. (2003) find that most of the countries with the greatest widening of the higher-primary wage 
gap are high-speed reformers in terms of capital account liberalization. Instead, they do not find a significant 
relationship between speed of the trade policy reforms and the wage gap.   
27 See Acemoglu (2002) for theoretical arguments on this point.  
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5. Public policy and redistribution  
Governments can alleviate or reinforce the “market” distributional changes with fiscal and 
other public policies. Unfortunately, there are no studies of the redistributive impact of 
public policies in Argentina on a yearly basis. Table 5.1 shows the results of a rough 
exercise intended to assess the distributional impact of fiscal policies since 1980. Benefit-
incidence results in Flood et al. (1994) and DGSC (2002) are used to assign social public 
spending in each program by deciles of the income distribution. Taxes are assigned based 
on Gasparini (1998) and DGSC (2002). Reported changes in the distributional impact of 
expenditures (the tax system) over time basically capture changes in the shares of different 
public programs (taxes), since there are no available annual benefit-incidence and tax 
incidence studies.  
 
Social  public expenditures (SPE) have been pro-poor (negative concentration index) over 
all the period considered. Figure 5.1 shows an increase in targeting in the first half of the 
80s, (basically due to a jump in the share of basic education and health in the budget since 
1983), a sharp fall in the late 80s, and an increase over the 90s to recover the levels of the 
early 80s. Progressivity of SPE has been growing over time, especially due to increasing 
income inequality. Taxes are more concentrated in the upper income strata (positive 
concentration index). Tax concentration rose in the 90s but not at the same speed as income 
concentration, making the tax system increasingly regressive (increasingly negative 
progressivity index).  
 
It can be shown (Lambert, 1993) that Ga-Gb=b(Ke+Kt), where Ga is the Gini after fiscal 
policy and Gb is the Gini before, b is public expenditures as a share of disposable income, 
and Ke and Kt are the Kakwani’s progressivity indices of expenditures and taxes, 
respectively. Figure 5.2 shows the distributional impact of fiscal policy in terms of the Gini 
coefficient Ga-Gb, the share of SPE in disposable income and the progressivity of the fiscal 
policy (Ke+Kt). The distributional impact has varied in the 80s as a result of large changes 
in the budget size and reallocations across programs. In the 90s the impact remained stable 
as a consequence of a budget slightly decreasing in size (as a share of income) and slightly 
increasing in progressivity. Figure 5.3 shows that although fiscal policy reduces the level of 
inequality it did not have a significant impact in affecting its pattern over the last decades.  
 
Figure 5.4 shows that public expenditure in targeted programs slowly increased in the 80s, 
dramatically fell in the crisis of the late 80s, and increased in the 90s. However, in terms of 
the poor population, spending in welfare programs dropped in the 80s and remained 
roughly constant at these lower levels in the 90s.  
 
Braun and Di Gresia (2003) show that social spending is highly procyclical in Argentina. 
The cyclical correlation GDP-social expenditures in the last three decades was 0.42, 
significantly higher than the Latin American average (0.32), and the OECD mean (-0.10). 
In World Bank (2000) the estimated elasticity of targeted social programs with respect to 
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changes in GDP for the period 1980-1997 is 1.86.28 This high positive correlation reveals 
budget cuts in recession times, when targeted programs are most needed.  Braun and Di 
Gresia (2003) argue that the reasons of such procyclicality lie in the political constraints on 
savings during expansions, the limited creditworthiness during recessions, and a low share 
of automatic stabilizers in the budget.  
  
The pro-market reforms helped to achieve unprecedented economic growth rates during 
most of the 90s in Argentina.  However, these extra resources were not efficiently used to 
deal with the distributional problems that were unfolding during that decade. During the 
90s Argentina did not save in order to being able to do countercyclical social policy in 
crisis times, did not build a larger safety net to alleviate the short-run consequences of 
increasing poverty, and did not implement effective labor policies to deal with the problems 
of displaced unskilled workers. It is likely that distributional outcomes would have been 
less negative had the government used the resources from high economic growth in sound 
labor and social policies.  
 
6. Concluding comments: reading the evidence  
In this concluding section we present our reading of the existing evidence. The view is 
rather conjectural and shaped by personal beliefs, since the literature has many holes and 
ambiguities. More research is definitely needed to have a clear view of the distributional 
changes in Argentina.  
 
Inequality and poverty have dramatically increased in Argentina since the 70s. Rather than 
reading this fact as a “trend”, we believe it is useful to single out the four episodes of 
distribution deterioration.29 Two of them coincide with acute macroeconomic crisis (88-89 
and 01-02). In these periods poor people are more prone to lose their jobs, reduce hours of 
work and have larger wage cuts. Although inequality and poverty sharply increase during 
crisis, as the economy recovers they tend to fall again.30 In this sense, they probably 
generate distributional changes that do not last long.31 The other two episodes of inequality 
rise (late 70s and 92-98) coincide with periods of “shocks” in the integration of Argentina 
to the world markets, and of weak labor institutions. These episodes probably have implied 
distributional changes of a larger duration. Data for the late 70s episode is scarce, so most 
of the available evidence, including this paper, refers to the closer episode of the 90s.  
 
Increasing integration to the global economy was very likely a significant determinant of 
the inequality jump in the nineties. Two are the main channels that link integration to 
inequality. The first one operates through sector reallocations. Being Argentina a country 
relatively abundant in natural resources and skilled labor, trade liberalization implied a shift 
                                                 
28 In contrast to Braun and Di Gresia (2003), estimates in World Bank (2000) imply that social spending is 
more procyclical than total spending.    
29 Atkinson (1997) stresses the approach of distributional episodes rather than trends.  
30 This was the case in the late 80s crisis, in other crisis in the world (e.g. see Neri (2000) for Brazil), and it 
seems to be the case in the current recovery of the Argentina’s economy.   
31 Whether inequality and poverty go back to the pre-crisis levels or not, and the reasons why they should are 
debatable topics. The point is that the inequality and poverty levels of the crisis are only transitory. 
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towards production and employment in sectors that use those factors more intensively, and 
in turn an increase in the relative return to natural resources and a widening of the wage gap 
between the skilled and the unskilled workers. The available evidence shows however that 
this story explains only a small part of the observed change in the income distribution. 
Globalization can affect inequality through a second channel. The fall in the price of capital 
and the introduction of new skilled labor intensive technologies, both likely consequences 
of the greater integration of Argentina to the world markets, implied an increase in the 
intensity of use of skilled labor in all the productive sectors, and hence an increase in the 
skill premium. This effect seems to be a more significant source of increasing income 
disparities.  
 
It is likely that the impact of globalization on the income distribution was greater in 
Argentina than in other countries in Latin America in part due to the faster pace at which 
the country has integrated to the global economy, and as a consequence of a more 
industrialized economic structure, and a significantly larger share of skilled labor. The 
reduction in the strength of the labor institutions may have also contributed to this greater 
impact.  
 
Fiscal and social policies did not have a very active role in alleviating the effects of 
increasing poverty and inequality. Actually, inequality trends are basically unchanged when 
government transfers (cash and in-kind) are included in the computation of household 
income. Argentina did not take advantage of the GDP growth in the 90s to build a social 
safety net that could have alleviated the market-driven distributional changes, to train or 
relocate displaced unskilled workers, or to save in order to be able to increase social 
spending during recessions.  
 
There is a heated debate in Argentina on the merits and demerits of globalization, and the 
convenience of undoing the process of integration. Many views against globalization point 
at their distributional adverse consequences. The literature indeed suggests that there have 
been links between liberalization and the distributional changes in Argentina. However, 
some qualification should be taken into account before taking that evidence for opposing 
globalization on distributional grounds. First, it is likely that the speed and depth of the 
economic changes in Argentina, and the absence of effective redistributive policies, are 
important in accounting for the jump in inequality and poverty. Other Latin American 
countries that have taken the road to more integration at a slower pace did not experienced 
large inequality increases, and in most of them poverty fell.  
 
Second, there is evidence that integration is a powerful instrument for economic growth and 
hence for aggregate welfare increase (despite its effects on inequality).32 Opposing to 
integration and new technology incorporation seems to be an unreasonable policy option, 
since economic growth is related to the capability of inserting the country in the global 
economy and of increasing the productivity through the absorption of new technologies. If 
Argentina decides to abandon the integration process, it is likely that a slowdown in GDP 
growth would follow. Although a slowdown might not affect inequality, it can have 
sizeable consequences in terms of poverty. Assuming an annual growth rate of 3% and no 
                                                 
32 See Bourguignon et al. (2002) for an excellent review of the economic consequences of globalization. 
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changes in unemployment, inequality and income support programs, a microsimulation 
exercise from the EPH 2002 yields the result that the poverty headcount ratio could reach 
30% in 10 years, from a current level of around 50%. If instead the growth rate were 5% 
poverty would fall to 23%, while it could be 15% if the growth rate were 8%. The 
differences could be larger if growth brings about a reduction in unemployment and more 
resources for income support programs. 
 
Most of the literature, including this paper, suggests that if following these arguments 
governments decide embracing globalization, they should be very aware of the possible 
unequalizing consequences of an integration process. In particular, governments should 
take measures to regulate the pace of the integration to the world markets, to provide the 
poor and unskilled with adequate safety nets, and to promote education and training to ease 
the transition. Many authors stress the relevance of transitional compensatory measures and 
gradual liberalization, although “there is no general prescription for what these policies 
should be” (Fischer, 2003).33 Failing to do that may increase the strength of the anti-
globalization arguments and place the whole process of integration into risk.34    
                                                 
33 See for instance Scheve and Slaughter (2001) and Behrman et al. (2003) for similar conclusions. 
34 Milanovic (2002) states that “current trends are likely to produce a backlash unless globalization is tamed”. 
Bourguignon et al. (2002) also point out that failing to address some of the costs of globalization would risk 
provoking a backlash. 
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Figure 2.1 
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 Source: Author’s calculations based on the EPH. 
 
Table 2.1 
Inequality measures  
Distribution of equivalized household income 
Greater Buenos Aires, 1974-2003 
 Shares of deciles Ratio
1 10 10/1 Gini Theil CV Atk(1) Atk(2)
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
OCT-74 3.0 25.1 8.2 0.324 0.187 0.752 0.166 0.379
OCT-80 2.6 28.4 11.0 0.374 0.241 0.796 0.209 0.367
OCT-81 2.3 31.8 14.1 0.410 0.308 0.977 0.249 0.427
OCT-82 2.3 30.8 13.2 0.399 0.299 1.011 0.239 0.414
OCT-84 2.0 32.8 16.6 0.421 0.373 1.465 0.269 0.458
OCT-85 2.4 29.2 12.4 0.389 0.262 0.837 0.227 0.400
OCT-86 2.4 30.6 13.0 0.399 0.289 0.939 0.236 0.405
MAY-87 2.3 31.4 13.4 0.402 0.303 1.003 0.241 0.411
OCT-87 2.0 32.3 15.9 0.423 0.329 1.045 0.265 0.453
MAY-88 1.8 33.2 18.0 0.445 0.359 1.070 0.292 0.496
OCT-88 1.9 32.3 17.3 0.431 0.333 1.027 0.279 0.492
MAY-89 1.8 33.9 18.4 0.444 0.382 1.404 0.293 0.511
OCT-89 1.6 38.3 24.1 0.494 0.478 1.411 0.351 0.659
MAY-90 1.7 33.9 19.4 0.450 0.394 1.477 0.306 0.568
OCT-90 2.1 33.9 16.1 0.436 0.370 1.196 0.279 0.465
MAY-91 1.9 33.3 17.2 0.439 0.345 1.009 0.283 0.487
OCT-91 2.1 34.2 16.0 0.435 0.390 1.390 0.277 0.450
MAY-92 2.2 31.2 14.2 0.407 0.296 0.921 0.246 0.423
OCT-92 2.2 31.6 14.7 0.418 0.311 0.952 0.258 0.450
MAY-93 2.0 33.2 16.8 0.432 0.354 1.147 0.276 0.462
OCT-93 1.8 31.4 17.0 0.420 0.316 0.966 0.268 0.479
MAY-94 2.0 32.4 16.2 0.424 0.327 1.010 0.267 0.458
OCT-94 2.0 33.0 16.4 0.431 0.346 1.091 0.274 0.459
MAY-95 1.8 33.0 18.3 0.436 0.343 1.023 0.284 0.497
OCT-95 1.7 35.6 21.2 0.461 0.395 1.142 0.311 0.521
MAY-96 1.7 34.4 20.0 0.451 0.370 1.069 0.300 0.517
OCT-96 1.7 34.7 20.5 0.458 0.388 1.134 0.312 0.557
MAY-97 1.6 34.9 21.4 0.462 0.390 1.114 0.315 0.542
OCT-97 1.6 34.3 21.3 0.457 0.384 1.237 0.311 0.539
MAY-98 1.6 35.3 22.3 0.468 0.396 1.116 0.321 0.550
OCT-98 1.5 35.7 24.3 0.477 0.415 1.161 0.336 0.569
MAY-99 1.4 35.7 25.4 0.473 0.410 1.146 0.334 0.582
OCT-99 1.5 34.7 22.6 0.465 0.388 1.079 0.321 0.559
MAY-00 1.5 36.0 24.2 0.480 0.419 1.148 0.338 0.571
OCT-00 1.4 35.7 26.1 0.480 0.415 1.130 0.344 0.607
MAY-01 1.2 37.7 32.0 0.498 0.455 1.221 0.368 0.629
OCT-01 1.1 37.6 34.0 0.506 0.458 1.174 0.381 0.654
MAY-02 0.9 38.8 42.6 0.522 0.501 1.299 0.409 0.686
OCT-02 1.1 39.3 35.5 0.518 0.492 1.260 0.391 0.627
MAY-03 1.2 38.8 31.2 0.518 0.489 1.258 0.385 0.615  
 Source: Author’s calculations based on the EPH.  
CV=coefficient of variation. Atk (ε) refers to the Atkinson index from a CES 
welfare function with parameter ε. 
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Table 2.2 
Inequality measures  
Distribution of household per capita income 
Greater Buenos Aires, 1974-2003 
 Shares of deciles Ratio
1 10 10/1 Gini Theil CV Atk(1) Atk(2)
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
OCT-74 2.8 26.2 9.5 0.345 0.215 0.842 0.187 0.410
OCT-80 2.3 29.2 12.6 0.390 0.264 0.844 0.228 0.409
OCT-81 2.0 32.8 16.6 0.427 0.334 1.038 0.271 0.464
OCT-82 2.1 32.0 15.5 0.420 0.342 1.190 0.264 0.453
OCT-84 1.8 33.8 19.1 0.439 0.398 1.508 0.291 0.495
OCT-85 2.1 30.6 14.5 0.409 0.293 0.902 0.250 0.439
OCT-86 2.1 31.6 15.0 0.417 0.318 1.010 0.258 0.442
MAY-87 2.1 32.7 15.5 0.427 0.350 1.132 0.259 0.439
OCT-87 1.8 33.6 18.9 0.444 0.369 1.163 0.292 0.494
MAY-88 1.6 34.3 21.3 0.462 0.391 1.144 0.316 0.535
OCT-88 1.6 33.3 20.7 0.449 0.363 1.078 0.303 0.534
MAY-89 1.6 35.4 22.1 0.467 0.442 1.831 0.322 0.555
OCT-89 1.4 39.8 28.9 0.515 0.531 1.556 0.380 0.686
MAY-90 1.5 35.1 23.1 0.471 0.438 1.673 0.333 0.538
OCT-90 1.8 35.6 19.7 0.461 0.415 1.284 0.310 0.509
MAY-91 1.7 35.1 20.9 0.462 0.387 1.093 0.313 0.530
OCT-91 1.9 36.2 19.3 0.461 0.445 1.558 0.308 0.494
MAY-92 2.0 33.0 16.6 0.431 0.333 0.988 0.274 0.466
OCT-92 1.9 33.3 17.2 0.441 0.352 1.052 0.287 0.495
MAY-93 1.7 34.8 20.1 0.457 0.398 1.252 0.305 0.503
OCT-93 1.6 32.9 20.1 0.443 0.356 1.069 0.296 0.520
MAY-94 1.8 33.9 19.2 0.447 0.366 1.088 0.295 0.500
OCT-94 1.8 35.0 19.6 0.457 0.395 1.214 0.305 0.503
MAY-95 1.6 34.3 21.6 0.457 0.377 1.085 0.311 0.539
OCT-95 1.5 37.2 25.2 0.484 0.441 1.241 0.341 0.564
MAY-96 1.5 36.1 23.9 0.477 0.420 1.187 0.333 0.562
OCT-96 1.5 36.5 25.1 0.484 0.440 1.256 0.345 0.603
MAY-97 1.4 36.3 25.6 0.486 0.434 1.224 0.347 0.583
OCT-97 1.4 35.8 25.4 0.480 0.430 1.372 0.341 0.577
MAY-98 1.4 36.9 26.7 0.491 0.443 1.222 0.352 0.592
OCT-98 1.3 37.5 29.8 0.501 0.467 1.277 0.369 0.611
MAY-99 1.2 37.3 30.7 0.498 0.459 1.245 0.367 0.623
OCT-99 1.3 36.4 27.0 0.488 0.431 1.168 0.351 0.598
MAY-00 1.3 37.7 29.3 0.503 0.466 1.240 0.370 0.611
OCT-00 1.2 37.5 31.4 0.505 0.468 1.245 0.377 0.647
MAY-01 1.0 39.2 38.3 0.520 0.502 1.319 0.399 0.668
OCT-01 1.0 39.1 40.7 0.527 0.503 1.273 0.411 0.692
MAY-02 0.8 40.6 51.9 0.545 0.557 1.460 0.441 0.721
OCT-02 0.9 40.6 42.7 0.538 0.535 1.334 0.421 0.664
MAY-03 1.1 40.4 37.8 0.539 0.536 1.349 0.418 0.655  
 Source: Author’s calculations based on the EPH.  
CV=coefficient of variation. Atk (ε) refers to the Atkinson index from a CES 
welfare function with parameter ε. 
 
 
Table 2.3 
Inequality measures 
Distribution of individual earnings 
Greater Buenos Aires, 1980-2003 
 Shares of deciles Ratio
1 10 10/1 Gini Theil CV Atk(1)
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
OCT-80 2.5 35.2 13.8 0.424 0.377 1.353 0.261
OCT-82 2.5 31.8 12.9 0.395 0.306 1.032 0.235
OCT-85 2.5 31.5 12.6 0.390 0.310 1.201 0.231
OCT-86 2.4 32.8 13.6 0.406 0.334 1.150 0.247
MAY-87 2.5 32.9 13.1 0.410 0.323 1.047 0.248
OCT-87 2.3 33.8 14.7 0.420 0.334 1.035 0.260
MAY-88 2.1 34.7 16.7 0.440 0.372 1.140 0.283
OCT-88 1.9 33.9 18.2 0.437 0.355 1.061 0.284
MAY-89 1.8 36.3 20.3 0.453 0.418 1.403 0.305
OCT-89 1.7 38.1 22.1 0.476 0.469 1.479 0.333
MAY-90 1.9 35.2 18.8 0.435 0.401 1.424 0.293
OCT-90 2.1 34.1 15.9 0.417 0.366 1.258 0.271
MAY-91 2.3 33.6 14.3 0.415 0.336 1.067 0.258
OCT-91 2.4 35.7 15.1 0.429 0.431 1.680 0.280
MAY-92 2.7 31.7 11.8 0.392 0.296 0.993 0.229
OCT-92 2.6 31.7 12.4 0.397 0.300 0.986 0.234
MAY-93 2.3 34.0 14.8 0.417 0.361 1.237 0.261
OCT-93 2.3 33.0 14.2 0.411 0.327 1.060 0.252
MAY-94 2.2 33.1 14.8 0.413 0.324 1.022 0.255
OCT-94 2.4 32.3 13.3 0.402 0.306 0.996 0.241
MAY-95 1.9 33.0 17.3 0.419 0.328 1.001 0.268
OCT-95 1.7 35.0 19.9 0.438 0.369 1.109 0.290
MAY-96 1.9 33.8 18.1 0.428 0.349 1.099 0.275
OCT-96 1.6 34.4 20.9 0.437 0.367 1.118 0.292
MAY-97 1.7 35.8 21.0 0.451 0.391 1.153 0.305
OCT-97 1.7 33.4 19.3 0.429 0.341 1.030 0.282
MAY-98 1.7 35.5 21.3 0.449 0.383 1.128 0.304
OCT-98 1.5 35.7 23.6 0.457 0.397 1.161 0.316
MAY-99 1.6 34.7 21.4 0.447 0.376 1.109 0.304
OCT-99 1.6 34.4 21.2 0.445 0.372 1.098 0.300
MAY-00 1.5 35.6 23.6 0.455 0.397 1.166 0.313
OCT-00 1.4 34.7 24.0 0.450 0.368 1.037 0.309
MAY-01 1.3 35.9 27.4 0.464 0.403 1.143 0.328
OCT-01 1.2 36.5 30.1 0.473 0.414 1.142 0.342
MAY-02 1.1 36.5 32.5 0.473 0.422 1.200 0.347
OCT-02 1.2 38.4 32.1 0.499 0.471 1.304 0.370
MAY-03 1.2 36.8 31.4 0.487 0.437 1.175 0.362  
 Source: Author’s calculations based on the EPH. 
CV=coefficient of variation. Atk (ε) refers to the Atkinson index from a CES 
welfare function with parameter ε. 
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Table 2.4 
Inequality measures 
Distribution of hourly wages 
Greater Buenos Aires, 1974-2003 
 Shares of deciles Ratio
1 10 10/1 Gini Theil CV Atk(1)
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
OCT-74 2.5 29.6 11.7 0.368 0.286 1.163 0.212
OCT-80 2.3 35.5 15.7 0.438 0.406 1.446 0.279
OCT-81 2.3 34.8 14.8 0.429 0.366 1.180 0.267
OCT-82 2.4 35.4 14.9 0.428 0.511 3.457 0.273
OCT-85 2.6 34.2 13.3 0.417 0.369 1.308 0.254
OCT-86 2.6 34.0 13.1 0.413 0.374 1.496 0.251
MAY-87 2.5 34.6 13.6 0.423 0.375 1.322 0.259
OCT-87 2.4 34.1 14.0 0.422 0.343 1.070 0.258
MAY-88 2.2 36.4 16.7 0.451 0.410 1.284 0.292
OCT-88 2.1 34.6 16.4 0.435 0.357 1.076 0.277
MAY-89 1.9 36.4 19.1 0.457 0.410 1.260 0.303
OCT-89 1.9 39.6 21.3 0.491 0.517 1.705 0.342
MAY-90 2.2 35.1 16.1 0.432 0.366 1.144 0.277
OCT-90 2.4 35.1 14.5 0.422 0.389 1.368 0.265
MAY-91 2.4 34.7 14.4 0.425 0.383 1.367 0.265
OCT-91 2.7 32.1 12.0 0.394 0.302 1.005 0.237
MAY-92 2.8 32.0 11.4 0.392 0.301 1.031 0.225
OCT-92 2.8 32.3 11.7 0.396 0.312 1.066 0.230
MAY-93 2.6 32.7 12.6 0.401 0.326 1.136 0.239
OCT-93 2.6 31.9 12.3 0.399 0.303 1.009 0.235
MAY-94 2.4 32.6 13.5 0.406 0.313 1.008 0.244
OCT-94 2.6 32.1 12.2 0.397 0.294 0.950 0.232
MAY-95 2.4 31.9 13.4 0.402 0.313 1.095 0.242
OCT-95 2.3 32.8 14.5 0.413 0.318 0.997 0.253
MAY-96 2.3 34.1 14.5 0.421 0.382 1.525 0.262
OCT-96 2.2 34.4 15.8 0.424 0.368 1.273 0.267
MAY-97 2.1 34.0 16.3 0.430 0.352 1.083 0.272
OCT-97 2.2 33.4 15.2 0.419 0.346 1.157 0.261
MAY-98 2.2 34.4 15.6 0.430 0.360 1.158 0.270
OCT-98 2.0 34.7 16.9 0.436 0.370 1.172 0.279
MAY-99 2.2 32.9 15.2 0.420 0.330 1.030 0.261
OCT-99 2.1 32.9 15.5 0.423 0.333 1.040 0.263
MAY-00 2.1 33.9 16.4 0.430 0.354 1.100 0.274
OCT-00 2.1 33.5 16.2 0.431 0.343 1.034 0.273
MAY-01 1.9 34.6 18.3 0.442 0.365 1.088 0.288
OCT-01 1.8 34.7 19.1 0.448 0.375 1.114 0.296
MAY-02 1.8 34.6 18.8 0.441 0.373 1.164 0.289
OCT-02 1.7 36.7 21.7 0.468 0.431 1.304 0.320
MAY-03 2.0 35.5 17.7 0.449 0.394 1.205 0.294  
Source: Author’s calculations based on the EPH. 
CV=coefficient of variation. Atk (ε) refers to the Atkinson index from a CES 
welfare function with parameter ε. 
 
Table 2.5 
Changes in inequality measures  
Distribution of equivalized household income 
Greater Buenos Aires, 1974-2002 
 Shares of deciles Ratio
1 10 10/1 Gini Theil CV Atk(1) Atk(2)
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
Equivalized household income
74-80 -0.5 3.2 2.7 0.051 0.054 0.043 0.043 -0.012
80-86 -0.2 2.2 2.0 0.024 0.047 0.143 0.027 0.038
86-92 -0.2 1.1 1.7 0.019 0.022 0.013 0.022 0.046
92-98 -0.7 4.0 9.6 0.059 0.104 0.208 0.077 0.119
98-02 -0.4 3.6 11.3 0.042 0.077 0.099 0.055 0.058
Per capita household income
74-80 -0.4 2.9 3.1 0.045 0.050 0.002 0.041 -0.001
80-86 -0.2 2.5 2.5 0.027 0.054 0.166 0.031 0.033
86-92 -0.2 1.7 2.2 0.024 0.034 0.042 0.028 0.053
92-98 -0.7 4.2 12.6 0.060 0.116 0.224 0.082 0.116
98-02 -0.3 3.1 12.9 0.037 0.067 0.057 0.052 0.053
Earnings
80-86 -0.1 -2.4 -0.2 -0.018 -0.044 -0.204 -0.014 0.006
86-92 0.1 -1.0 -1.2 -0.009 -0.033 -0.164 -0.013 -0.025
92-98 -1.0 4.0 11.2 0.060 0.097 0.176 0.082 0.160
98-02 -0.3 2.7 8.4 0.042 0.074 0.143 0.054 0.068
Hourly wages
74-80 -0.3 5.9 4.0 0.070 0.119 0.284 0.067 0.079
80-86 0.3 -1.5 -2.6 -0.025 -0.031 0.049 -0.028 -0.054
86-92 0.2 -1.7 -1.4 -0.017 -0.062 -0.430 -0.021 -0.030
92-98 -0.7 2.3 5.2 0.040 0.057 0.106 0.049 0.095
98-02 -0.4 2.0 4.8 0.032 0.062 0.132 0.041 0.073  
Source: Author’s calculations based on the EPH. 
CV=coefficient of variation. Atk (ε) refers to the Atkinson index from a CES 
welfare function with parameter ε. 
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Figure 2.2 
Lorenz curves 
Distribution of equivalized household income 
Greater Buenos Aires, 1974-2002 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on the EPH.  
 
Figure 2.3 
Density functions  
Log of equivalized household income  
Greater Buenos Aires, 1974-2002 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on the EPH.  
Note: estimation by kernels.  
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Table 2.6 
Inequality measures 
Distribution of equivalized household income 
Argentina, 1992-2002 
 Shares of deciles Ratio
1 10 10/1 Gini Theil CV Atk(1) Atk(2)
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
MAY-92 2.1 31.9 15.4 0.418 0.317 0.985 0.260 0.449
OCT-92 1.9 32.5 16.7 0.430 0.331 0.998 0.274 0.472
MAY-93 1.9 33.2 17.7 0.437 0.360 1.155 0.283 0.481
OCT-93 1.8 32.0 17.5 0.430 0.331 1.007 0.277 0.488
MAY-94 1.9 33.0 17.8 0.436 0.347 1.047 0.283 0.486
OCT-94 1.9 33.0 17.3 0.436 0.350 1.082 0.281 0.477
MAY-95 1.8 33.1 18.8 0.439 0.348 1.038 0.288 0.500
OCT-95 1.7 35.0 20.9 0.456 0.388 1.166 0.307 0.518
MAY-96 1.7 34.5 20.9 0.454 0.379 1.106 0.306 0.528
OCT-96 1.6 34.5 21.4 0.457 0.385 1.128 0.312 0.552
MAY-97 1.6 35.1 21.9 0.463 0.397 1.174 0.317 0.542
OCT-97 1.6 34.7 22.0 0.460 0.392 1.251 0.315 0.544
MAY-98 1.6 35.5 22.5 0.469 0.401 1.146 0.322 0.548
OCT-98 1.5 35.8 23.9 0.474 0.414 1.172 0.331 0.558
MAY-99 1.4 35.8 25.3 0.475 0.415 1.172 0.335 0.577
OCT-99 1.5 34.8 22.7 0.465 0.390 1.092 0.321 0.561
MAY-00 1.5 35.7 24.4 0.476 0.415 1.158 0.335 0.572
OCT-00 1.3 35.9 26.7 0.481 0.421 1.195 0.345 0.602
MAY-01 1.2 37.0 30.7 0.491 0.444 1.211 0.360 0.616
OCT-01 1.1 37.2 32.4 0.499 0.448 1.176 0.370 0.632
MAY-02 1.0 38.3 38.5 0.514 0.488 1.316 0.395 0.669
OCT-02 1.2 38.4 31.4 0.507 0.474 1.253 0.375 0.610
MAY-03 1.2 38.2 30.9 0.507 0.470 1.229 0.374 0.612  
 Source: Author’s calculations based on the EPH. 
CV=coefficient of variation. Atk (ε) refers to the Atkinson index from a CES 
welfare function with parameter ε. 
 
Table 2.7 
Gini coefficient 
Distribution of household income 
GBA, 1974-2002 and Argentina, 1992-2002 
Equivalized Equivalized Equivalized Equivalized Equivalized Per capita Total Equivalized Equivalized Equivalized Equivalized
household household household household household income household income A income A income A income A
income income income income income Only labor income Age 0-10 Age 20-30 Age 40-50 Age 60-70
A B C D E 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x) (xi)
GBA
1974 32.1 31.7 31.1 31.0 32.1 34.5 36.3 31.3 31.5 29.8 31.8
1980 37.6 37.4 37.1 36.9 37.7 39.5 41.9 39.0 35.6 36.6 39.0
1986 40.4 40.0 40.0 39.7 40.8 40.9 43.1 42.0 37.6 40.0 38.5
1992 42.6 41.7 41.8 41.2 42.9 43.8 44.1 42.6 39.5 44.8 42.6
1998 48.1 47.1 47.2 46.4 48.5 50.5 47.2 47.8 45.4 47.6 47.1
2002 52.2 51.3 51.5 50.7 52.6 54.6 49.6 55.1 50.0 53.1 46.7
Argentina
1992 43.0 42.2 42.3 41.6 43.4 44.7 44.2 43.2 40.0 44.7 42.6
1994 43.7 42.6 42.9 42.0 44.2 45.6 44.1 44.4 41.7 43.8 42.5
1996 46.1 45.0 45.3 44.4 46.6 48.1 45.3 45.4 44.2 48.1 43.0
1998 47.5 46.5 46.6 45.8 47.9 49.8 46.9 47.2 46.4 45.8 45.7
2000 48.3 47.2 47.6 46.6 48.9 51.0 46.3 49.7 45.3 48.7 44.2
2002 51.5 50.5 50.7 49.8 51.9 54.3 48.7 53.6 48.7 52.4 46.5  
 Source: Author’s calculations based on the EPH. 
Note: Equivalized income=household income/(A+α1.K1+α2.K2)θ, where A=adults, K1=children  under 5, and K2=children aged 6 to 
14.  A: θ=0.9, α1=0.5 and α2=0.75; B: θ=0.75, α1=0.5 and α2=0.75;  C: θ=0.9, α1=0.3 and α2=0.5; D: θ=0.75, α1=0.3 and α2=0.5; E: 
Amsterdam scale. Adult equivalent equal to 0.98 for men between 14 and 17, 0.9 for women over 14, 0.52 for children under 14, and 1 
for the rest. 
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Table 2.8 
Gini coefficient 
Distribution of equivalized household income 
Standard errors and confidence intervals  
GBA, 1974-2003 
Value Std. Err Coef. Var. 95% interval
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
1974 32.4 0.454 1.402 (31.2, 33.0)
1980 37.5 0.342 0.912 (36.8, 38.2)
1982 39.9 0.650 1.628 (38.6, 41.2)
1985 38.9 0.301 0.773 (38.3, 39.5)
1986 39.9 0.387 0.971 (39.1, 40.6)
1987 42.3 0.379 0.897 (41.5, 43.0)
1988 43.1 0.379 0.879 (42.4, 43.9)
1989 39.9 0.589 1.474 (38.7, 41.1)
1990 40.9 0.800 1.956 (39.3, 42.4)
1991 43.5 0.787 1.809 (42.0, 45.1)
1992 41.8 0.411 0.982 (41.0, 42.6)
1993 46.5 0.385 0.828 (45.7, 47.3)
1994 43.1 0.506 1.173 (42.1, 44.1)
1995 46.1 0.416 0.902 (45.3, 46.9)
1996 45.9 0.472 1.030  (44.9, 46.8)
1997 45.7 0.438 0.960 (44.8, 46.6)
1998 47.5 0.397 0.836 (46.7, 48.2)
1999 46.5 0.345 0.742 (45.8, 47.2)
2000 48.0 0.363 0.756 (47.3, 48.7)
2001 50.6 0.348 0.687 (49.9, 51.3)
2002 51.8 0.552 1.065 (50.7, 52.9)
2003 51.8 0.621 1.199 (50.5, 53.0)  
Source: Author’s calculations based on the EPH. 
Note: The Gini coefficient is expressed in the [0,100] interval.  
Estimation by bootstrap with 200 replications. 
 
 
Figure 2.4 
Gini coefficient 
Distribution of household per capita income 
Around 1990 and around 2000 
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Source: Gasparini (2003). 
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Figure 2.5 
Poverty headcount ratio 
Official poverty line 
Greater Buenos Aires, 1980-2003 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on the EPH. 
 
Table 2.9 
Poverty measures (FGT) 
Official poverty line 
Greater Buenos Aires, 1992-2003 
FGT(0) FGT(1) FGT(2)
MAY-92 0.193 0.062 0.031
OCT-92 0.178 0.057 0.031
MAY-93 0.177 0.061 0.034
OCT-93 0.168 0.063 0.035
MAY-94 0.161 0.056 0.031
OCT-94 0.190 0.068 0.037
MAY-95 0.222 0.087 0.052
OCT-95 0.248 0.098 0.058
MAY-96 0.267 0.106 0.064
OCT-96 0.279 0.114 0.068
MAY-97 0.263 0.103 0.058
OCT-97 0.260 0.104 0.061
MAY-98 0.243 0.093 0.052
OCT-98 0.259 0.108 0.063
MAY-99 0.271 0.110 0.065
OCT-99 0.267 0.107 0.062
MAY-00 0.297 0.124 0.071
OCT-00 0.289 0.122 0.071
MAY-01 0.327 0.144 0.089
OCT-01 0.354 0.163 0.104
MAY-02 0.497 0.266 0.183
OCT-02 0.543 0.271 0.176
MAY-03 0.516 0.255 0.159  
Source: Author’s calculations based on the EPH. 
Note: FGT(0)=headcount ratio, FGT(1) poverty gap. 
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Figure 2.6 
Growth-incidence curve 
Proportional change in real income by income percentile 
Equivalized household income distribution 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on the EPH and National Accounts. 
Note: income from household surveys adjusted to match national disposable income from National Accounts 
 
 
 
Table 2.10 
Proportional change in real income by income quintiles 
Equivalized household income distribution 
74-80 80-86 86-92 92-98 98-02
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
1 -9.3 -24.0 -6.0 -5.4 -37.4
2 -2.7 -21.8 -3.9 10.2 -25.2
3 1.4 -21.3 -1.1 13.5 -17.6
4 7.2 -20.1 2.0 22.1 -15.4
5 17.6 -15.5 8.0 35.5 -9.1  
Source: Author’s calculations based on the EPH and National Accounts. 
Note: income from household surveys adjusted to match national disposable income from National Accounts 
 
Figure 2.7 
Aggregate welfare  
Four abbreviated welfare functions 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on the EPH. 
Note: see Lambert (1993) for details on the aggregate welfare functions. Atk(e) refers to the function  
proposed by Atkinson (1970): a CES function with parameter equal to e.  
Income from household surveys adjusted to match national disposable income from National Accounts 
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Table 2.11 
Bipolarization 
Esteban, Gradín and Ray, and Wolfson indices 
           Equivalized income Household per capita incom
EGR Wolfson EGR Wolfson
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
GBA
1974 0.092 0.266 0.104 0.301
1980 0.118 0.335 0.122 0.344
1986 0.126 0.347 0.130 0.375
1992 0.140 0.374 0.148 0.409
1998 0.163 0.456 0.172 0.503
2002 0.184 0.484 0.190 0.530
Argentina
1992 0.140 0.400 0.149 0.427
1994 0.142 0.407 0.151 0.425
1996 0.147 0.419 0.158 0.454
1998 0.154 0.441 0.163 0.464
2000 0.158 0.459 0.169 0.493
2002 0.167 0.483 0.177 0.521  
Source: Author’s calculations based on the EPH. 
 
 
Table 2.12 
Educational mobility index 
13-19 20-25
(i) (ii)
GBA
1974 0.904 0.808
1980 0.888 0.845
1986 0.900 0.870
1992 0.902 0.793
1998 0.867 0.778
2002 0.872 0.847
Argentina
1992 0.918 0.841
1994 0.912 0.835
1996 0.923 0.820
1998 0.874 0.812
2000 0.892 0.807
2002 0.918 0.832  
Source: Author’s calculations based on the EPH. 
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Figure 3.1 
Wage-education profile 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on the EPH. 
Note: Predicted wages for male household heads aged 40 married with two children.  Primary incomplete=100 in each year 
 
Figure 3.2 
Standard deviation of the error term in the hourly wage equation  
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Source: Author’s calculations based on the EPH. 
 
Figure 3.3 
Worked hours-education profile 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on the EPH. 
Note: Predicted hours for male household heads aged 40 married with two children. Primary incomplete=100 in each year 
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Figure 3.4 
Unemployment rate, labor force participation and employment rate 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on the EPH. 
 
 
Table 3.1  
Microsimulations 
Changes in the Gini coefficient 
Actual Returns to Gender wage Returns to Unobservable Hours of Employment Education
change education gap experience factors work
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
1980-1986
   Hourly wages -1.8 -1.8 0.7 -2.6 -1.7 1.2
   Earnings 0.3 -1.4 0.7 -2.9 -1.0 -0.1 1.3
   Household income 2.9 -1.6 0.0 0.3 -0.8 0.7 0.0 0.7
1986-1992
   Hourly wages -2.5 -3.2 -1.7 0.2 -0.6 -0.7
   Earnings -1.7 -1.0 -1.1 2.0 0.5 -0.3 -0.2
   Household income 0.7 -0.9 0.1 -0.5 0.4 0.9 -0.1 0.0
1992-1998
   Hourly wages 5.9 3.7 -0.8 -0.3 2.6 0.4
   Earnings 7.3 2.9 -0.4 -0.9 2.0 2.5 0.8
   Household income 8.5 2.9 -0.1 0.8 1.7 1.8 0.2 0.6
1998-2002
   Hourly wages 3.5 0.7 0.4 -0.9 2.5 1.0
   Earnings 4.9 0.5 0.3 0.6 1.8 1.5 0.9
   Household income 6.2 0.9 0.0 -0.9 1.4 1.4 0.2 0.6  
Source: Author’s calculations based on the EPH. 
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Figure 4.1 
Indices of reforms 
International finance, trade and privatizations 
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Source: own calculations based on Morley et al. (1999). 
 
 
 
Table 4.1 
Employment (in hours of work) by sector 
Greater Buenos Aires, 1974-2002 
All workers
                       Share in total employment              Change in share of total employment
Sector of activity 1974 1980 1986 1992 1998 2002 74-80 80-86 86-92 92-98 98-02 74-02
Low-tech manufacturing industries 14.8 10.9 10.6 9.0 6.4 6.1 -3.8 -0.3 -1.6 -2.6 -0.3 -8.6
Medium and high-tech manufacturing 23.8 20.3 18.1 14.7 12.3 9.0 -3.5 -2.2 -3.4 -2.3 -3.3 -14.7
Construction 6.7 9.4 6.1 4.5 5.4 4.9 2.7 -3.3 -1.6 0.9 -0.6 -1.8
Wholesale and retail 16.5 17.3 19.1 18.9 19.4 17.7 0.8 1.8 -0.2 0.5 -1.6 1.2
Communications, transportation and utilities 9.1 8.1 7.1 8.7 10.5 10.0 -0.9 -1.1 1.7 1.8 -0.6 0.9
Professional and business services 6.4 8.9 11.0 10.7 13.7 15.0 2.6 2.1 -0.3 3.1 1.2 8.6
Public administration, education and welfare 14.9 16.4 15.7 24.8 25.3 31.1 1.6 -0.7 9.0 0.6 5.8 16.3
Other unskilled services 8.0 8.6 12.4 8.7 6.9 6.2 0.5 3.8 -3.7 -1.9 -0.7 -1.9
Total 100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   
Less than high school
                       Share in total employment              Change in share of total employment
Sector of activity 1974 1980 1986 1992 1998 2002 74-80 80-86 86-92 92-98 98-02 74-02
Low-tech manufacturing industries 17.3 12.5 13.9 13.3 10.1 9.0 -4.8 1.4 -0.6 -3.2 -1.0 -8.3
Medium and high-tech manufacturing 25.3 21.1 19.0 17.5 15.4 9.6 -4.2 -2.0 -1.5 -2.1 -5.8 -15.7
Construction 7.8 12.0 8.7 6.9 10.4 8.8 4.2 -3.3 -1.8 3.4 -1.6 1.0
Wholesale and retail 18.0 19.7 20.7 20.4 21.6 23.4 1.7 1.0 -0.3 1.2 1.8 5.4
Communications, transportation and utilities 10.7 10.2 7.9 10.5 13.8 12.8 -0.5 -2.3 2.6 3.3 -1.0 2.1
Professional and business services 2.4 2.6 3.2 3.6 4.4 4.2 0.2 0.6 0.4 0.8 -0.2 1.8
Public administration, education and welfare 8.4 9.6 8.9 12.6 11.8 19.8 1.2 -0.7 3.7 -0.7 8.0 11.4
Other unskilled services 10.2 12.3 17.6 15.1 12.5 12.4 2.1 5.3 -2.5 -2.7 -0.1 2.2
Total 100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   
High school graduates
                       Share in total employment              Change in share of total employment
Sector of activity 1974 1980 1986 1992 1998 2002 74-80 80-86 86-92 92-98 98-02 74-02
Low-tech manufacturing industries 10.7 9.4 8.1 7.4 5.9 7.0 -1.3 -1.3 -0.7 -1.5 1.1 -3.7
Medium and high-tech manufacturing 25.1 22.0 18.7 14.3 13.2 11.0 -3.1 -3.3 -4.4 -1.1 -2.2 -14.1
Construction 3.8 4.7 2.5 3.2 3.6 3.9 0.9 -2.2 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.2
Wholesale and retail 17.2 17.8 21.6 23.6 25.6 22.3 0.6 3.8 2.0 2.0 -3.3 5.1
Communications, transportation and utilities 6.1 5.4 7.3 8.9 12.0 11.3 -0.7 1.9 1.5 3.2 -0.8 5.1
Professional and business services 14.0 15.7 17.7 15.1 15.7 15.9 1.7 2.0 -2.6 0.6 0.1 1.9
Public administration, education and welfare 18.4 22.2 17.0 22.7 18.9 23.8 3.8 -5.2 5.7 -3.8 4.9 5.4
Other unskilled services 4.6 2.7 7.1 4.9 5.0 4.8 -1.9 4.3 -2.2 0.2 -0.2 0.2
Total 100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   
College graduates
                       Share in total employment              Change in share of total employment
Sector of activity 1974 1980 1986 1992 1998 2002 74-80 80-86 86-92 92-98 98-02 74-02
Low-tech manufacturing industries 7.3 5.5 3.2 2.5 2.0 2.3 -1.7 -2.3 -0.8 -0.4 0.3 -5.0
Medium and high-tech manufacturing 11.0 12.2 13.2 9.2 7.2 6.4 1.2 0.9 -4.0 -2.0 -0.8 -4.7
Construction 5.7 5.6 3.4 1.3 0.9 1.9 -0.1 -2.2 -2.1 -0.4 1.0 -3.8
Wholesale and retail 4.9 3.3 8.0 8.5 9.2 7.1 -1.6 4.6 0.5 0.7 -2.0 2.2
Communications, transportation and utilities 4.9 2.7 3.4 4.8 4.3 5.7 -2.2 0.7 1.3 -0.4 1.3 0.8
Professional and business services 15.3 28.6 26.5 19.0 24.1 24.9 13.3 -2.1 -7.5 5.1 0.8 9.6
Public administration, education and welfare 49.5 41.0 38.6 53.9 50.8 50.4 -8.6 -2.3 15.3 -3.1 -0.4 0.9
Other unskilled services 1.3 1.0 3.7 0.9 1.4 1.3 -0.4 2.7 -2.7 0.5 -0.2 -0.1
Total 100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0    
Source: Author’s calculations based on the EPH. 
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Figure 4.2  
Share in employment (hours of work) 
All workers 
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Professional and business services Public administration, education and w elfare  
Source: Author’s calculations based on the EPH. 
 
 
Table 4.2 
Share of each educational group in aggregate labor 
Greater Buenos Aires, 1974-2002 
                   Share in aggregate labor input          Change in share of aggregate labor
Educational group 1974 1980 1986 1992 1998 2002 74-80 80-86 86-92 92-98 98-02 80-98 74-02
Less than high school 67.1     63.3     55.5     46.0     38.7     32.7     -3.8 -7.8 -9.4 -7.4 -5.9 -24.6 -34.3
High school graduates 22.6     25.0     29.7     32.4     32.6     34.9     2.4 4.7 2.7 0.3 2.2 7.6 12.2
College graduates 10.3     11.7     14.9     21.6     28.7     32.4     1.5 3.1 6.7 7.1 3.7 17.0 22.1
Total 100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0    
Source: Author’s calculations based on the EPH. 
 
 
Table 4.3 
Share of each educational group in employment by sector 
Greater Buenos Aires, 1974-2002 
   Less than high school      High school graduates       College graduates
Sector of activity 1974 1980 1986 1992 1998 2002 1974 1980 1986 1992 1998 2002 1974 1980 1986 1992 1998 2002
Low tech manufacturing 78.5 72.6 72.8 67.7 61.0 48.2 16.4 21.5 22.6 26.5 30.0 39.7 5.1   6.0   4.6   5.9   9.0   12.1 
Basic and high tech manufacturing 71.3 65.8 58.4 55.0 48.3 34.7 23.9 27.1 30.7 31.5 35.0 42.4 4.8   7.1   10.8 13.5 16.7 22.8 
Construction 78.4 80.5 79.4 70.9 73.9 59.1 12.9 12.5 12.1 22.7 21.5 28.3 8.8   7.0   8.4   6.4   4.7   12.7 
Wholesale and retail trade 73.3 72.1 60.2 49.8 43.2 43.2 23.6 25.7 33.6 40.5 43.1 43.8 3.1   2.3   6.2   9.7   13.6 13.0 
Communications, transport and utilities 79.1 79.4 62.1 55.4 50.9 42.1 15.4 16.7 30.7 32.8 37.3 39.5 5.5   3.9   7.2   11.7 11.8 18.4 
Professional and business services 25.5 18.3 16.3 15.6 12.3 9.2   49.8 44.0 47.8 45.9 37.4 36.9 24.8 37.7 35.9 38.5 50.4 54.0 
Public administration, education and welfare 37.7 36.9 31.3 23.4 18.0 20.8 28.0 33.8 32.1 29.7 24.4 26.7 34.2 29.3 36.5 47.0 57.6 52.5 
Other services 85.2 90.7 78.7 79.7 70.2 66.0 13.1 8.0   16.9 18.0 23.9 27.3 1.7   1.3   4.4   2.3   6.0   6.7   
Changes
   Less than high school      High school graduates       College graduates
Sector of activity 74-80 80-86 86-92 92-98 98-02 74-02 74-80 80-86 86-92 92-98 98-02 74-02 74-80 80-86 86-92 92-98 98-02 74-02
Low tech manufacturing -6.0 0.2 -5.1 -6.7 -12.7 -30.3 5.1 1.2 3.8 3.5 9.7 23.3 0.9 -1.4 1.3 3.2 3.0 7.0
Basic and high tech manufacturing -5.5 -7.3 -3.5 -6.7 -13.6 -36.5 3.2 3.6 0.8 3.4 7.5 18.5 2.3 3.8 2.7 3.2 6.1 18.0
Construction 2.1 -1.0 -8.5 3.0 -14.8 -19.3 -0.4 -0.4 10.6 -1.3 6.8 15.4 -1.8 1.4 -2.1 -1.7 8.0 3.9
Wholesale and retail trade -1.3 -11.9 -10.3 -6.6 -0.1 -30.1 2.0 7.9 6.9 2.7 0.7 20.2 -0.8 4.0 3.4 4.0 -0.6 10.0
Communications, transport and utilities 0.3 -17.3 -6.7 -4.6 -8.8 -37.0 1.3 14.0 2.2 4.5 2.2 24.1 -1.6 3.3 4.5 0.1 6.6 12.9
Professional and business services -7.1 -2.0 -0.7 -3.3 -3.1 -16.3 -5.7 3.8 -1.9 -8.6 -0.5 -12.9 12.9 -1.8 2.6 11.9 3.6 29.2
Public administration, education and welfare -0.8 -5.6 -8.0 -5.3 2.8 -16.9 5.8 -1.7 -2.4 -5.3 2.3 -1.4 -5.0 7.3 10.4 10.6 -5.1 18.3
Other services 5.5 -12.0 1.0 -9.5 -4.2 -19.2 -5.1 8.9 1.1 5.9 3.4 14.2 -0.4 3.1 -2.1 3.7 0.7 5.0  
Source: Author’s calculations based on the EPH. 
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Table 4.4  
Aggregate decompositions  
Changes in share of labor 
Greater Buenos Aires, 1974-2002 
 
Between
74-80 80-86 86-92 92-98 98-02 80-98 74-02
Less than high school -1.6 -0.5 -3.8 -1.9 -2.1 -6.1 -8.4
High school graduates 0.5 0.3 0.7 0.6 -0.7 1.3 0.8
College graduates 1.1 0.2 3.1 1.4 2.8 4.8 7.6
Within
74-80 80-86 86-92 92-98 98-02 80-98 74-02
Less than high school -2.2 -7.3 -5.6 -5.5 -3.8 -18.5 -25.9
High school graduates 1.8 4.3 2.0 -0.3 2.9 6.3 11.4
College graduates 0.4 3.0 3.6 5.8 0.9 12.2 14.5
Overall
74-80 80-86 86-92 92-98 98-02 80-98 74-02
Less than high school -3.8 -7.8 -9.4 -7.4 -5.9 -24.6 -34.3
High school graduates 2.4 4.7 2.7 0.3 2.2 7.6 12.2
College graduates 1.5 3.1 6.7 7.1 3.7 17.0 22.1
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the EPH. 
 
 
Figure 4.3 
Aggregate decompositions  
Changes in share of labor 
Greater Buenos Aires, 1974-2002 
Between and within effects 
 
Between 
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Table 4.5  
Coefficients of the capital investment and import penetration variables  
interacting with educational dummies in a log hourly wage equation 
By lag in the capital investment variable  
                        Lags
0 1 3
Capital investment
   Primary school -0.011** -0.009** -0.013**
   High school -0.003 -0.001 -0.005
   College  0.029** 0.020**  0.029**
Import penetration
   Primary school 0.045 0.043 0.052*
   High school 0.046 0.044 0.052*
   College 0.085** 0.076** 0.087**  
Source: Acosta and Gasparini (2003) 
Note: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%. 
 
Figure 4.4 
Conditional wage gap  
as a function of sectoral capital investment/value added  
and import penetration/value added 
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Figure 4.5  
Share of college educated individuals in adult population  
LAC countries, around 2000  
 
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
0
5
10
15
20
25
 
Source: own calculations based on Gasparini (2003).  
 
Figure 4.6  
Ratio between bottom quintile and top quintile  
in the number of children under 12 per household 
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Source: Gasparini (2003). 
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Table 5.1 
Redistributive impact of the fiscal policy 
Argentina, 1980-2002 
          Kakwani progressivity index Redistributive
   Concentration index SPE Taxes Total impact Gini-post
SPE Taxes Gini-pre (iii)-(i) (ii)-(iii) (iv)+(v) SPE/Yd (vi)*(vii) (iii)-(viii)
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix)
1980 -0.034 0.350 0.391 0.424 -0.041 0.383 0.407 0.156 0.235
1981 -0.033 0.338 0.427 0.460 -0.090 0.370 0.433 0.160 0.267
1982 -0.034 0.340 0.420 0.454 -0.081 0.373 0.407 0.152 0.268
1983 -0.045 0.344 0.430 0.475 -0.086 0.389 0.477 0.186 0.244
1984 -0.053 0.343 0.439 0.492 -0.096 0.396 0.517 0.205 0.234
1985 -0.036 0.353 0.409 0.445 -0.056 0.389 0.401 0.156 0.253
1986 -0.042 0.352 0.417 0.459 -0.065 0.394 0.489 0.193 0.224
1987 -0.035 0.354 0.444 0.479 -0.090 0.389 0.551 0.214 0.230
1988 -0.036 0.358 0.449 0.485 -0.091 0.394 0.486 0.191 0.258
1989 -0.023 0.369 0.515 0.538 -0.146 0.392 0.436 0.171 0.344
1990 -0.015 0.352 0.461 0.477 -0.109 0.367 0.443 0.163 0.299
1991 -0.019 0.344 0.461 0.480 -0.117 0.363 0.382 0.139 0.323
1992 -0.021 0.340 0.441 0.462 -0.102 0.360 0.372 0.134 0.307
1993 -0.029 0.344 0.443 0.472 -0.099 0.373 0.362 0.135 0.308
1994 -0.027 0.348 0.457 0.484 -0.109 0.375 0.372 0.139 0.317
1995 -0.023 0.351 0.484 0.507 -0.133 0.374 0.376 0.141 0.344
1996 -0.022 0.353 0.484 0.506 -0.131 0.375 0.357 0.134 0.350
1997 -0.032 0.354 0.480 0.511 -0.126 0.385 0.348 0.134 0.346
1998 -0.033 0.359 0.501 0.534 -0.142 0.392 0.340 0.133 0.368
1999 -0.039 0.362 0.488 0.527 -0.126 0.401 0.367 0.147 0.341
2000 -0.037 0.368 0.505 0.542 -0.137 0.405 0.357 0.145 0.360
2001 -0.037 0.373 0.527 0.564 -0.154 0.410 0.382 0.157 0.370
2002 -0.037 0.371 0.538 0.575 -0.167 0.408 0.351 0.143 0.395  
Source: own estimates.  
Note: SPE=social public expenditures, Yd=national disposable income.  
 
Figure 5.1 
Concentration index and progressivity index 
Social public expenditures and taxes 
Argentina, 1980-2002 
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Figure 5.2 
Budget size, progressivity and  
distributional impact of fiscal policy  
Argentina, 1980/2002 
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Figure 5.3 
Gini coefficients for the distribution of household per capita income 
Before and after fiscal policy 
Argentina, 1980-2002 
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Figure 5.4 
Public expenditures in welfare programs  
 
Mean over the period=100 Pesos per poor person
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Source: own estimates based on information from DGSC. 
 
